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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background of the research 
 
 
The internationalization of agricultural trade and food supply chains has introduced new 
challenges for planning trade policy and controlling of agriculture and food related haz-
ards. Globalization has enhanced agro-food trade and availability of food supplies, in-
creased economic growth especially in developing countries but simultaneously created 
risks for food safety concerning animal, plant and human health (Hoffmann 2010). Many 
countries have nationally adopted divergent hygiene regulations and practices to increase 
their food safety or to protect their domestic production while international organizations 
have tried to harmonize standards to free and facilitate global agro-food trade (Koo & 
Kennedy 2007, 96).  
Trade agreements between two or more countries are called regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) and their number has been increasing during the last decades (Bhagwati & 
Krishna & Panagariya 2014, 2−3). Already over 50% of all world agricultural products 
are traded within or between RTAs and therefore RTAs provide an important level play-
ing field for agricultural trade. (WTO 2016). This explains the need to consider trade in 
agro-food products more carefully in the context of regional trade agreements. It is also 
important to recognize the special characteristics for trade caused by economic integra-
tion in comparison to classical free trade. Economic integration refers to the theoretical 
background which is based on the functioning of regional trade agreements 
Agro-food trade has typically enjoyed special treatment in regional trade agreements be-
cause of the sensitive nature of the sector (Josling 2010, 3; OECD 2015, 10). However, 
further pressure is imposed on liberalization of agricultural trade which appear in in-
creased frequency of agricultural matters involved in trade negotiations. Most agricultural 
tariffs have successfully been reduced and consequently non-tariff barriers (NTBs) e.g. 
differences in regulatory aspects have become evident. NTB related questions have turned 
out to be challenging and time consuming topics in the negotiations of trade agreements. 
The highly ambitious negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
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(TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) exemplify this mat-
ter. The inclusion of agricultural sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) makes the 
TTIP an outstanding and challenging trade agreement (Pacheco 2015).  
Even though both the EU and the US have implemented the highest hygiene standards 
and regulations in their food supply chains, there are some fundamental differences how 
food safety is interpreted. The US follows risk-based approach while the EU applies pre-
cautionary principle (European Parliament 2015, FDA 2012; USTR 2014a). The precau-
tionary principle is a preventive approach practiced throughout the food supply chain 
while the risk-based approach in the US ensures that the end product is free from patho-
gens. This difference can be seen for example in the production of poultry meat which is 
a longstanding issue between the US and the EU. The US routinely applies pathogen 
reduction treatments (PRTs) to eliminate pathogens e.g. Salmonella from poultry meat. 
Pathogen reduction treatments are not allowed in the EU and consequently the US imports 
have been banned since 1997 when the EU outlawed such practices. (USDA 2016; John-
son 2015.) Since 1997 the EU has allowed only water as a substance to reduce pathogens 
from food products. (USTR 2014a, 47; European Parliament 2014b, 60; Regulation (EC) 
No 853/2004; WTO 2009) This is an evident example of a sanitary and phytosanitary 
measure which act as a significant trade barrier to the US who is the second important 
poultry meat exporter to the world markets.  
The US is seeking new markets for its poultry meat products as the growth of the country's 
poultry meat sector and the overall agriculture is based on export growth (Zhuang and 
Moore 2015). The markets in the European Union are very attractive to the US and the 
country aims to renew its access to the EU markets. The trade deal between the EU and 
the US would give some future hope for the US even though the EU is not willing to 
negotiate about the pathogen reduction treatments. The US objectives include tariff and 
non-tariff elimination for agricultural products to utilize the export potential of the agri-
cultural sector (USTR 2014b.) The EU has been defensive in opening its markets to the 
US poultry meat as it aims to protect consumers and its domestic producers.  
The importance of regional trade agreements in world trade and the growing inclusion of 
agro-food sector in trade negotiations encourage the dissection of the subject. Additional 
research on the field of economic impacts of sanitary and phytosanitary measures is well 
needed. In addition, the trade agreement between the EU and the US is an important trade 
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agreement for the whole world and especially for the EU. The US markets provide divided 
opportunities for the EU producers and thus there is a need to increase knowledge con-
cerning the possible impacts of this agreement. Poultry meat sector was chosen for this 
analysis because it is a growing and an important sector for the EU and for the US. Also 
the PRTs serve a good example of a sanitary and phytosanitary measure as a trade barrier.  
 
1.2. Objectives and structure 
 
 
The first part of the study concentrates on clarifying the concept of regional trade agree-
ments. Understanding the main characteristics and concepts is necessary for successful 
analysis and evaluation of trade effects related to RTAs. The theory of economic integra-
tion is used to describe the nature of trade patterns in RTAs and is presented later on. 
Knowledge of both the concepts and the theory, contributes the researcher’s ability to 
answer the research questions and to draw consistent conclusions. The reader should keep 
in mind that the emphasis of this study is on bilateral trade, not on international trade in 
general. 
 
The second theme under discussion deals with sanitary and phytosanitary measures which 
turn out to distort agricultural trade. The continuously increasing number of regional trade 
agreements with deeper integration has revealed policy measures other than tariffs which 
hinder trade in agro-food products. In most cases sanitary and phytosanitary measures are 
fully justified but occasionally are misused to hinder foreign trade. For some countries 
SPS measures turn out to be significant trade barriers causing substantial welfare losses.  
 
The trade negotiations between the EU and the US create a fruitful environment to study 
bilateral trade and difficulties caused by SPS measures. The TTIP negotiations embody 
challenging agro-food trade features that have been on the table for years. These main 
divergences are summarized and briefly described. A part is also devoted to revise the 
positioning of the US and the EU as players in global poultry meat trade. The meaning is 
to broaden the perspective to better understand why these two countries have conflicting 
views in SPS measures related to poultry meat trade.  
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The empirical part of this study first, examines the SPS measure effects in bilateral trade 
context by utilizing partial equilibrium analysis. Second, attempts to quantify the static 
welfare effects of a change in SPS measure related trade policy in poultry meat trade 
between the EU and the US. Based on these, this study attempts to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
 What are regional trade agreements (RTAs)? 
 What are sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and their role in agricultural 
trade? 
 What could be the welfare effect for the EU of allowing trade in poultry meat pro-
duced under pathogen reduction treatment (PRT) conditions?  
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2. Regional trade agreements 
 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are reciprocal trade agreements between two or more 
countries aiming to facilitate trade and overall cooperation between the contracting coun-
tries. These agreements are not bound to geographical locations as the trend is towards 
long-distance trade agreements. (e.g. Pal 2004, 2; Hansen 2013, 111−120; WTO 2016.) 
Bilateral trade agreement refers to an agreement between two parties (Brownsell 2012). 
A contracting party can be a single country or an existing regional trade agreement. For 
example India–Japan agreement and the TTIP are bilateral trade agreements. Even though 
the EU consists of 28 member countries, it negotiates as a single entity (European Com-
mission 2015b, 3). 
 
It is worthwhile to separate the concepts of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trade 
agreement. Plurilateral trade agreement is an agreement between many countries. Multi-
lateral trade agreement often refers to trade between numerous countries or the world 
trading system as a whole (Brownsell 2012). General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) was the first multilateral trade agreement and created the multilateral trading 
system in 1947. Today World Trade Organization (WTO) is known as the successor body 
of the GATT with 162 member countries in 2016. It is necessary to note that regional 
trade agreements are an exception to the GATT article XXIV and they are seen to sup-
plement the WTO trade objectives. (WTO 2016a.)  
 
Multilateral trade negotiations of the World Trade Organization have not succeeded in 
eliminating trade barriers and promoting free trade as intended which explains the late 
surge of RTAs after the 1990s (Bhagwati & Krishna & Panagariya 2014, 2−3). The num-
ber of RTAs has nearly ten folded after the year 1990 and according to the WTO over 
half of total world trade takes place among these agreements. Figure 1 shows the devel-
opment of the amount of regional trade agreements. In Figure 1, the outstanding change 
in cumulative number of inactive RTAs illustrates the enlargement of the EU in 2004. 
Numerous trade agreements between the EU-15 and the East-European countries were 
invalidated. In 2016, WTO/GATT had registered 419 regional trade agreements and the 
number of RTA notifications reached 625. (WTO 2016.)  
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The increase in and the motives to establish trade agreements can be explained through 
the comparative advantage and the gains from trade (Baldwin 2014). The traditional trade 
theory suggests that regional trade agreements are only the second best alternative to ar-
range world trade as free trade would create larger welfare gains. (Hansen 2013, 125–
128; Korinek & Melatos 2009, 6.) This is the basic argument used when discussing 
whether RTAs have positive or negative impacts on international trade. The significance 
of economic gains as a motive in establishing RTAs cannot be undervalued but other 
variables should be considered alongside. (see e.g. Whalley 1998, OECD 2015, 5−11).  
 
The integration level of a negotiated RTA and the strategic positions of parties often re-
veal if additional motives exist. Such might be for instance increased political influence 
or negotiation power, reduced threat to conflicts and geo-political objectives (Fulponi & 
Shearer & Almeida 2011, 9). The deeper the degree of integration the more integrated 
Figure 1 Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the world 1948-2016 (WTO 2016), 
published with the permission from the WTO. 
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markets, policies and laws parties have. The increasing inclusion of services, investment-
related matters and regulatory co-operation has created a need to broaden the integration 
in agreements. (Lejárraga 2014, 9; Neufeld 2014; Baldwin 2014.) An interesting devel-
opment in RTAs in addition to deeper level of integration is the trend towards mega-
regional agreements. These mega-regionals involve many countries, powerful and diverse 
economies, large volumes of trade aiming to reach common trade rules exceeding the 
WTO obligations. (World Economic Forum 2014.) The Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership between the two largest economies in the world is an example of a 
mega-regional with highly ambitious objectives in creating new trade standards for world 
trade. 
 
2.1. Integration levels 
 
The degrees of integration can be divided into different categories depending on the in-
terpretation of the concept ‘regional trade agreement’. Pal (2004, 2−4) and Taifeng (2009, 
5) use broad categorization in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), free trade agreements 
(FTAs), customs unions (CUs), common market (CM) and economic unions shown in 
Figure 2. These five levels can further be divided into shallow and deep integration level 
agreements (Pal 2004, Lejárraga 2014, 9−10; Baldwin 2014). This research utilizes afore-
mentioned categorization because it enables clear understanding of the diversity of the 
RTAs and provides tools to discern and evaluate the differences among agreements.  
Figure 2 Integration levels in regional trade agreements. (After Pal 2004). 
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Figure 2 symbolizes the integration levels so that the bigger the circle and the darker the 
colour, the deeper is the integration level. Preferential trade agreements typify the shal-
lowest degree of integration and are illustrated as the smallest and the lightest circle in 
Figure 2. PTAs are trade agreements where existing trade barriers (mainly tariffs) are 
partially lowered but not totally abolished for goods which are produced among the con-
tracting parties. In PTAs the trade barrier reductions are tailored country by country and 
good by good basis leaving space for discriminatory practices. (Pal 2004, 2.)  
In free trade agreements contracting parties abolish trade barriers between the FTA mem-
ber countries but each country retain own trade policies towards non-member countries. 
Free trade agreements can be partial when trade in selected sectors are included to the 
agreement. Full free trade agreements cover all sectors but are rare in comparison to par-
tial free trade agreements. (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 168; Houck 1986, 151.) FTAs are the 
most common type of regional trade agreements probably because there is possibility for 
the exclusion of sensitive or complex sectors and policy co-operation. Some examples of 
free trade agreements are North-American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
The third of the shallow integration level agreements is customs union (CU), located in 
the middle circle in Figure 2. CUs are similar to FTAs but in addition to free trade, mem-
ber countries integrate their trade policies. This means that they establish a common trade 
policy for customs union towards third countries. (Houck 1986, 151.) In the simplest case 
a trade policy could mean a common tariff faced by imports from non-member countries. 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) are examples of customs unions.  
Common market (CM) differs from customs union because it includes free production 
factor movements between the member countries. Furthermore, other policies such as 
fiscal, monetary or agricultural policies might be aligned and decision-making centralized 
to some extent. Common market is a pre-stage of an economic union. The European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) was a common market agreement before the formation of the 
European Union. EEC was an example of an economic union agreement. The deepest 
level of integration is found in economic union (Eu) where member countries have com-
mon markets, free factor movements and unified fiscal, monetary and other main policies. 
Economic union is also characterized by a single currency and centralized decision mak-
ing. (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 168, Pal 2004, 2; Houck 1968, 151.) 
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Also Balassa (1961, 174) introduced five levels of integration but differences are strongly 
drawn on political basis. Houck (1986, 151−152) and Koo and Kennedy (2007, 167−168) 
utilize the same categorization as Pal and Taifeng but ignore preferential trade agreements 
adapting the WTO classification. WTO categorizes RTAs in free trade agreements 
(FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) which are notified under GATT 1994 Article XXIV:7, 
and paragraph 2 (c) of the Enabling Clause, and economic integration agreements (EIAs) 
under GATS Article V:7 (WTO 2016; Bhagwati et al. 2014, 11). In addition, preferential 
trade arrangements which are comparable to preferential trade agreements, are listed by 
WTO but not primarily recognized as RTAs as they are seen to discriminate against the 
most favoured nation (MFN) principle. This principle means that WTO member countries 
are not allowed to discriminate between the WTO member countries by granting others 
lower customs duties or other treatments alike (WTO 2016).  
In this point, it is essential to note that regional trade agreements are commonly but some-
times misleadingly called as free trade agreements even though they do not correspond 
the FTA categorization principles. These agreements nearly never cover all trade sectors 
or even all sectors within one sector. This phenomenon might partly explain the fierce 
resistance faced by regional trade agreements in public as the knowledge of the concept 
is insufficient. Free trade does not necessarily refer to a situation where all trade barriers 
are abolished. It is rather finding common rules, minimizing costs and ensuring functional 
trade.  
 
2.1.1. Enlargements of the European Union 
 
The European Union forms itself a regional trade agreement with the deepest level of 
integration. The enlargement stages for the EU are listed in Table 1. The predecessor of 
the EU was established by six countries (Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands) in 1957. The first enlargement took place in 1973 when Denmark, 
Ireland and United Kingdom became members. In 1981 Greece and in 1986 Portugal and 
Spain joined the customs union. Finland, Sweden and Austria became members in 1995 
and in this point the EU had already 15 members (EU-15). In 2004 Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia be-
came new members (EU-25). Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007 (EU-27) and Croatia 
in 2013 (EU-28). (European Union 2016.) 
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Table 1 The enlargements of the European Union (European Union 2016). 
Year Country Abbreviation 
1957 Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, Luxembourg, The Neth-
erlands 
EU-6 
1973 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom EU-9 
1981 Greece EU-10 
1986 Portugal, Spain EU-12 
1995 Finland, Sweden, Austria EU-15 
2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
EU-25 
2007 Bulgaria, Romania EU-27 
2013 Croatia EU-28 
 
2.2. Non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade 
 
The tariff levels for industrialized goods have been reduced successfully while agricul-
tural sector has long maintained its special treatment in regional trade agreements 
(Bhagwati et al. 2014, 18; Josling 2010, 1; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 95−96). Estevadeordal 
and Shearer and Suominen (2008, 25) studied market access provisions both tariffs and 
non-tariff measures in 50 different RTAs, and found that industrial goods are largely less 
protected than agricultural products. The article of XXIV of GATT requires the inclusion 
of agricultural products in RTAs but gives some flexibility to its treatment because for 
many countries agriculture is a vulnerable sector (OECD 2015, 10; European Commis-
sion 2013a, 9). The granted flexibility for agriculture is also justified for being the most 
complex sector in the international trade negotiations arena (Josling & Tangermann 2014, 
1).  
 
The agricultural sector is increasingly facing pressure to abolish remaining tariffs which 
explain the increase in use of non-tariff measures (WTO 2016). On the other hand, that 
the tariff measures are abolished the non-tariff measures become visible and thus the at-
tention is turned to that way (von Lampe & Jeong 2013; Fulponi et al. 2011, 17; European 
Commission 2013b; Deardorff & Stern 1997, 3). According to European Commission 
(2013a) non-tariff barriers are often used in a protectionist manner as the possibilities to 
use tariffs under the WTO/GATT obligations are reduced. Governments have used tariffs 
to protect their domestic agricultural producers and now when the tariffs are not applica-
ble, the non-tariff measures could be thought to be used in the same way. 
   17 
   
The problematic nature of agricultural trade in trade negotiations arise largely from non-
tariff barrier matters, especially between developed countries. NTBs are all other 
measures than tariffs applied by governments to intentionally or unintentionally distort 
trade and the category cover a range of divergent measures (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 113).  
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) are the 
main categories of NTBs related to agro-food trade. The rough difference between SPS 
and TBT measures is that SPS measures focus on safety of agro-food products while the 
latter on quality. (Josling 2004, 26−28, 40, 51). NTBs are often associated with developed 
regulation and legislation pursuing high food safety and quality. Identification of such 
measures as trade barriers has proved challenging. Furthermore, quantification of their 
impacts on trade in monetary value is far more difficult than for tariffs (Deardorff & Stern 
1997, 3). The impact of tariffs can be derived from the explicit cost while the impact of 
NTBs comprise from explicit and implicit costs. Both measures are present in the nego-
tiations between the EU and the US in which the food safety regulation is well developed. 
  
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures in agro-food trade have become a source of trade 
conflicts and disputes among various countries. The excessive regulations and trade dis-
putes are seen to cause significant losses in agricultural trade and welfare. For this reason, 
the WTO has a SPS Agreement targeting to harmonize regulatory standards multilater-
ally.  (Upton & Otte 2004, 1, 13; Mitchell 2003, 17−21; Roberts & Josling & Orden 1999, 
20.) For instance, in recent history trade disputes has arisen from use of hormone in beef 
production (1989−2009), genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (2004−2006), and 
pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs) in poultry meat (ongoing) between the EU and the 
US. Aforementioned matter are significantly impeding the US agricultural trade. (Library 
of the European Parliament 2013; USTR 2014a; Johnson 2015.) Disputes stem from the 
prohibitive behaviour of SPS measures against foreign competition which is known as 
trade distortion effect (Houck 1986, 81).  
 
The regulatory divergence in agricultural sector hamper the RTA processes. Roberts et 
al. (1999, 1) mention that NTBs are particularly prevailing in trade of primary and pro-
cessed agricultural goods. The complexity is ever growing despite the efforts made to 
unify the regulatory framework in international level. The regulatory cooperation among 
countries through common implementation of international standards would have a great 
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facilitating effect on trade. The explanation why governments continuously apply diverg-
ing agro-food regulations is explained by the attempt to correct market failures and neg-
ative externalities (Mitchell 2003; Roberts et al. 1999, 1, 25). Market failures and negative 
externalities relate for example consumer demand on food safety or environmental wel-
fare. Markets are in disequilibrium if suppliers provide too little e.g. food safety de-
manded by consumers.  
 
2.3. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a bilateral trade and investment 
agreement being negotiated between the EU and the US. The agreement would cover one 
third of world trade and a half of the world gross national product. The negotiations 
started in 2013 but have stalled as a consequence of divergences in ambition levels. The 
aim of TTIP is to promote transatlantic economic growth and provide new job opportu-
nities by improving market access. (European Parliament 2014a; IATP 2013.) The agree-
ment has three main topics: market access, regulatory co-operation and international 
rules. The customs duties between the EU and the US are generally low and the focus is 
on finding a common solution on the area of regulatory issues. (European Commission 
2015; USTR. 2014b; European Parliament 2014b; CEPR 2013; Ecorys 2009.) The fol-
lowing summarizes the main regulatory matters that appear between the EU−US and are 
categorized as SPS measures. Not all issues enter the proposed TTIP but are a source of 
prolonged debate. 
 
2.3.1. Pathogen reduction treatments in poultry meat 
 
The US poultry meat industry routinely employ PRTs to reduce the amount of hazardous 
bacteria in poultry meat. Literally, the poultry meat is rinsed or sprayed with antimicrobial 
substances such as chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite, trisodium phosphate and 
peroxyacids. (Johnson 2015, USTR 2009). The EU prohibited such treatments in 1997 
and allowed only potable water to be used to clean the meat. Since the US has tried to 
negotiate with the EU to legalize PRTs or to allow imports of PRT poultry meat to the 
EU markets. Even though the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has stated that 
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PRTs are not necessarily an immediate threat to health, the EU has not legalized PRTs 
for food products. (Johnson 2015, European Parliament 2014b, 60; Arita et al. 2014, 12; 
USDA 2009; WTO 2009; Regulation (EC) No 853/2004.) 
 
 
In 2009, the US requested the WTO dispute settlement body to file the EU for the PRT 
issue. Before filing, the US exchanged letters with the EU to settle the issue. The two 
enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2008 might well explain the willingness of the US 
to take such measures. The US wanted the WTO to ensure the compatibility of the EU 
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practises with the WTO rules based on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. The 
US claimed that the EU banned the use of pathogen reduction treatments without scien-
tific evidence and that the EU preferred strict and costly hygiene practises throughout its 
food supply chain. (Johnson 2015; Arita et al. 2014, 11; USTR 2009, WTO 2009.) 
Poultry meat exports from the US have diminished significantly to the European Union 
since the PRT ban became effective. In 1997, the quantities traded were not highly af-
fected but after the EU enlargement in 2004 and in 2007, the US lost its main markets in 
Europe (Arita et al. 2014, 11; Johnson 2015). Figure 3 shows in country basis the share 
of total imports from the US to the 27 European countries in years 1995−2010. One can 
see that the main importers during that time were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ro-
mania and Greece. Of those countries only Greece was a member of the EU before the 
prohibition of PRTs came in force. (USDA 2016 & FAOSTAT 2016.)  
 
2.3.2. Other sanitary and phytosanitary issues 
 
Regulatory differences exist on the area of agricultural biotechnology including genet-
ically modified organisms (GMOs), novel foods and cloning. GMOs have been a topic of 
controversy over decades between the EU and the US (USTR 2014a; IATP 2013). So far, 
the European Union has allowed only one GM-maize to be cultivated in its territory and 
GM-maize and GM-soybean to be used in feed and foodstuffs. The EU applies strict 
traceability, labelling and cultivation regulations for GMOs and other foods produced by 
utilizing new technology. The US is the world leader in the use of GM-technologies and 
approximately 70% of the food products include GMOs.  
Other issues considering new biotechnologies are novel foods and cloning. The EU has 
stringent rules and pre-market entry procedures for novel foods (e.g. nanotechnology) and 
cloned animals. (USTR 2014a; European Parliament 2014a; Regulation (EC) No 
1830/2003; Regulation (EC) No 854/2004.) The EU is said to be the most challenging 
market for novel foods and when it comes to the food deprived from cloned animals, not 
a one application for pre-market entry procedure has been sent in to the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA). (European Parliament 2015, 30−35.) 
Antibiotics are commonly used in the US agriculture. Around 80% of all antibiotics sold 
in the US are passed to the food supply chain. Problems evolve because antibiotics are 
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uses for non-therapeutic purposes especially in animal production. Non-therapeutic pur-
poses refer to the growth promoting characteristics of antibiotics and are extensively used 
in poultry production. The EU allows antibiotic use only for therapeutic purposes to treat 
a disease. The excess use of antibiotics boost the birth of drug resistant pathogens and 
increase the probability of hazardous diseases. (Center for Food Safety 2014.)  
Another growth promoter is called Ractopamine which is used in pork production in the 
US. It is a non-hormonal substance and is utilized in around 60 to 80% of US pork meat 
production. The European Union and 160 other countries have banned the use of the sub-
stance because it was doomed to cause a threat to animal and human health. (Center for 
Food Safety 2014; IATP 2013.). Also hormones have been used in the US beef production 
since 1950s. The EU prohibits the use of hormone in meat products and in farm animals. 
Over 90% of US beef is grown with hormones. (European Parliament 2015, 30−35 & 
2014b; 59.) 
In the dairy sector the matter concern acceptable number of somatic cells in raw milk, 
regulation for pasteurised milk and the use of Bovine Somatropin (BST) hormone. In the 
US the number of somatic cells is limited to 750 000 cells/ml while in the EU correspond-
ing value is 400 000 cells/ml (USTR 2014a; APHIS 2012). For the US, the question con-
cerning somatic cells is purely related to the quality aspect and not the safety of milk. For 
pasteurised milk, the US regulation ‘Grade A’ Pasteurised Milk Ordinance, causes the 
EU producers a significant trade impediment because the compliance is practically im-
possible to EU firms. There are only two European dairy firms who are allowed to export 
pasteurised milk products to the US. (McLaughlin 2006; Eucolait; European Parliament 
2014b, 50.) The third difference exist in the use of BST hormone in US milk production 
as it is not allowed in the EU. Around 17% of the US milk is produced using BST hor-
mone to increase the milking yield.  
Debate exists also in standards of organic production, legislation for animal welfare and 
maximum residue levels (MRLs). The EU and the US have agreed an organic equivalency 
agreement implying that organic standards are recognised equal excluding a few excep-
tions. For example, the US prohibits the use of antibiotics at any stage of the organic 
production, not even for therapeutic purposes while in the EU this is allowed (USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service 2015b; GAIN 2012; European Commission 2012.)  
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Differences is legislation for animal welfare vary significantly between the EU and the 
US. The EU has a comprehensive and strict regulations and directives concerning farm 
animal welfare while in the US such legislation is non-existent. What exists, is guidelines 
for good slaughtering practices.  (FOE 2015). MRLs deal with questions of e.g. maximum 
pesticide, chemical and antibiotic residues in agro-food products. The EU applies stricter 
values for MRLs that the US or many other countries. MRL questions has been raised 
also by other trade partners not only the US. 
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3. Poultry meat trade 
3.1. Global trade of poultry meat  
 
Global exports of poultry meat have nearly doubled during the last twenty years and con-
sequently, poultry meat has become the main source of animal protein. However, in 2015 
overall poultry meat trade faced a small decline for the first time after year 2009. This 
decline is partly explained by the increase in domestic production in significant importing 
countries. Trade in poultry meat is expected to recover in 2016 and world production and 
consumption to grow. This provides bright future insights for poultry meat sector. (USDA 
FAS 2016; FAO 2015, 46, 49; AVEC 2014.)  
 
Brazil, the United States and the European Union has dominated the global trade in poul-
try meat. Approximately 70% of all poultry meat exports originate from Brazil and the 
US. The share for the EU fluctuates around 20%. However, the EU benefits from being a 
regional trade agreement because of the internal effect of trade creation. The internal 
poultry meat exports within the EU combined with the exports to the rest of the world 
account for over one fourth of global exports of poultry meat. (USDA FAS 2016; FAO 
2015, 50; The Poultry Site 2015; USDA 2016; Zhuang & Moore 2015; Johnson 2015; 
Weaver 2014.) Figure 4 shows the distribution of exported global poultry meat and the 
exporters’ share of total world trade is captured in Figure 5.   
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The relation in quantity exported between the US and Brazil have been relatively stable 
during last decades. In 2015 the exports from the US decreased by 445 thousand tons and 
from Brazil increased 283 thousand tons. (USDA FAS 2016.) The loss in the US exports 
was due to many simultaneous factors. First, the US exports to Russia decreased by 
138 thousand tons because of the economic sanctions. Second, HPAI outbreak in the US 
caused countries to set full or partial import bans for poultry meat originating from the 
infected areas. As a consequence, the exports for Brazil increased nearly 100 thousand 
tons. The third factor was strong Dollar against Brazil’s Real which weakened the com-
petitiveness for the US. Furthermore, the US lost export markets because the low oil 
prices pressed the demand for poultry meat in oil-industry dependent countries such as 
Venezuela and Angola. (USDA FAS 2016; Zhuang & Moore 2015; FAO 2015.)  
 
 
 
Global trade flows of poultry meat have undergone shifts for many reasons. For example 
Brazil’s exports have increased rapidly and partially because of the outbreaks of HPAI in 
varying parts of the world. Other shifters have been sanitary and phytosanitary regulations 
and concerns, volatility in exchange rates, variation in feed prices, development in popu-
lation and income and changes in consumer preference. Also the trade embargo set by 
Russia has impacted in trade flows. Russia has been a significant importer of poultry 
meat. However, shifts in trade flows are likely to continue, especially due to increasing 
market volatility and uncertainty. (Davis 2015, 1−3; Global Food Security 2015; FAO 
2015, 49; Conway 2015.) 
Brazil
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Figure 5 Distribution of world poultry meat exports in 2015 (European Commission 
2016a). 
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Japan and China including Hong Kong are the main importers of poultry meat. China has 
made efforts in increasing domestic production but has suffered from HPAI-outbreaks 
having a declining effect on production. The imports of China and Japan are expected to 
remain stable in 2016. Increase is expected in imports for Mexico and South Africa while 
decline in expected for the EU and the Russian Federation. (FAO 2015, 49−50.) The main 
importing countries of poultry meat are shown in Figure 6 and the share of main importers 
of global imports in Figure 7. The EU is both among the main exporters and importers 
while the US is one of the main exporters but not among the main importers of poultry 
meat. 
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Figure 6 The main importing countries of poultry meat in 2015 (European Com-
mission 2016a). 
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3.2. Trade in poultry meat between the EU and the US 
 
The US exports of poultry meat have grown significantly during the last twenty years 
with an annual growth rate of 5.5%. The share of exports of total US production of poultry 
meat has increased because the domestic production has not expanded as fast as the ex-
ports. The main export destinations for the US poultry meat include Mexico, Russia, An-
gola, Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong and China (Davis et al. 2013, 7−8). Exports are an im-
portant driver for the US poultry meat sector and for this reason the country is continu-
ously searching for new market opportunities. The US is interested to export poultry meat 
to the EU, as the EU market cover approximately 520 million inhabitants and high stand-
ard of living. One estimate is that the gain from wider market access (1/3 market share) 
to the EU would amount 600 million USD annually (546 million €). So far the US has 
exported roughly no poultry meat to the EU since the prohibition of PRTs in 1997. 
(Zhuang and Moore 2015; Johnson 2015; European Parliament 2014b, 60). 
 
The European Unions is a net exporter of poultry meat to the world markets. The EU 
poultry meat exports have grown much slower than the US exports as in 2012 the increase 
was only 1%, in 2013 faced by a slight decrease of less than 1% and in 2014 increased 
again by 5%. (European Commission 2016a; European Commission 2015a; Eurostat 
2016.) The slow development in exports is due to weak competitiveness of the EU poultry 
meat sector in comparison to the more competing markets (AVEC 2014; Pacheco 2015, 
6; Weaver 2014, 40−42).  
 
The competitiveness of the EU poultry meat sector is affected by strict legislation con-
cerning environment, animal welfare and food safety throughout the food supply chain. 
Also high production input prices lower the competitiveness. However, the competitive-
ness and viability of EU poultry meat production have been ensured with variety of trade 
policy measures which protected the EU producers from foreign competition. (AVEC 
2014; van Horne & Bondt 2014.) In comparison to the EU, the US poultry meat sector is 
more competitive in international markets as the producers in the US have accession to 
affordable production inputs. In addition, the government regulations and administrative 
surroundings are stable and less burdensome than in the EU. (Zhuang and Moore 2015, 
Van Horne & Bondt 2014.)  
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Figure 8 shows the development of the US and the EU world imports and exports of 
poultry meat during the years 1995 and 2010. The US exported significantly more than 
the EU and the US exports grew more. Looking at the imports, the EU imported more 
than the US and the quantity imported by the EU grew steadily during 1995 and 2010. 
Total EU imports of poultry meat from the US by category during 1995−2015 is shown 
in Figure 9. Broiler meat was the main poultry meat category imported.  
 
 
 
 
The US exports of poultry meat to the EU are mainly restricted by the prohibition of PRTs 
(SPS measure) but also by tariff-rate quota. The existing TRQ amounts for 16 665 tons 
of poultry meat but it is allocated for fresh and frozen broiler or turkey meat (Arita et al. 
2014, 13; Regulation (EC) No 536/2007).  Key categories such as prepared, preserved, 
salted or brined chicken meat are excluded from the TRQ. However these excluded cate-
gories are allowed to be imported from Brazil. Arita et al. argue that the US could be 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0
IN
 1
0
0
0
 T
O
N
S
TOTAL US AND EU POULTRY MEAT IMPORTS AND 
EXPORTS TO THE WORLD IN 1995 -2010
US exports EU exports US imports EU imports
Figure 8 Total EU and US poultry meat imports and exports to the world in 1995−2010 
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competitive enough to over market share from Brazil and Thailand in EU markets. That 
would require the EU to approve the use pathogen reduction treatments and to abolish or 
restructure the tariff-rate quota for the US. 
 
 
Arita et al. have provided three different outcomes that could be reached under the TTIP 
negotiations concerning different changes in trade policy including the TRQ and the SPS 
measure. First, a pure TRQ reform would provide an incentive to comply with the EU 
rules. However, bilateral trade would not be enhanced. Second, an approval of the PRTs 
would increase imports from the US at least for the countries which used to trade poultry 
meat with the US before accession to the European Union. These countries include for 
example Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Romania. The TRQ would still be in force 
to restrict trade. The third scenario would be to abolish both the SPS measure and the 
TRQ. This kind of policy reform would have an overall positive effect on the US poultry 
meat exports to the EU. (Arita et al. 2014, 13−15.) 
Figure 9 Total EU poultry meat imports from the US by category during 1995−2015 
(USDA 2016 & FAOSTAT 2016). 
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Figure 10 shows the development of poultry meat imports for EU-15 and EU-27 from the 
US during 1995−2010. The upper red line includes poultry meat imports of 27 European 
countries which later on became members of the EU, and thus are named as EU-27 in 
Figure 10. It seems that for EU-15 countries the trade has remained stable. Though, de-
clining trend is seen after 1998. The case is very different for countries which joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007. There is a high peak in imports in 1999 followed by a striking 
decline until 2001. The factor behind the decline may be the pre-accession period and the 
requirements to adjust the EU legislation. The main importers of the US poultry meat 
which joined the EU in 2004 were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. After 2004 the 
trade for the EU-27 countries is also following a declining trend. 
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4. Theoretical framework 
 
Free trade is largely considered to be the best option to arrange trade between countries 
but still international trade is restricted by various ways. Trade policies and national leg-
islations differ from country to country, sometimes leading to intentional or unintentional 
barriers for foreign goods to enter the market. Historical perspective evidence that tariffs 
and quotas were the main means or the most evident measures to restrict trade in the past. 
Elimination of tariffs and quotas has revealed modern trade policy measures which effec-
tively restrict and distort trade and are trickier than the classical trade policy measures.  
Especially in industrialized countries, trade negotiations are increasingly concentrated on 
eliminating other measures than tariffs. (Krugman & Obstfeld & Melitz 2015, 269; 
Snorrason 2012, 15; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 96−98; Houck 1986, 45, 151.) 
 
The following section introduces basics of the theory of international trade e.g. free trade 
and traditional gains from trade. As the study deals with regional trade agreements there 
is a need to consider the theory of economic integration. The basic concepts of trade di-
version and creation are explained. The third section concentrates on clarifying the effects 
of classical and modern trade policy measures. The last section covers elasticities which 
are needed in the empirical part of this study. 
 
4.1. Free trade and gains from trade 
 
International trade enables countries to attain higher welfare level than in autarky. Au-
tarky is a situation where no foreign trade occurs. Adam Smith and other early economists 
attempted to explain increased trade between countries with absolute advantage. Absolute 
advantage exists when a country has lower production costs than other countries at current 
prices and exchange rates. Prices and exchange rates are important determinants in inter-
national trade because traders want to sell at the highest price and buy with the lowest.  
(Koo & Kennedy 2007, 1−11; Houck 1986, 31.) However, absolute advantage was found 
to be insufficient to explain the willingness of a country to participate in international 
trade. (Houck 1986, 8). 
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In 1817 David Ricardo presented the theory of comparative advantage. Instead of abso-
lute costs of production, comparative advantage explained trade in terms of varying op-
portunity costs. The opportunity cost is defined as a number of a good that must be given 
up to produce another good from resources that could have been used to produce the first 
one. (Krugman & Obstfeld 2003, 10−12; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 14−15.) A country has a 
comparative advantage in production of a good if the opportunity cost of producing that 
good in terms of other goods is lower than in other countries (Houck 1986, 8−9). Thus 
differences in opportunity costs determine the imports and exports of a country. Compar-
ative advantage also assumes that production conditions vary among countries affecting 
the production while absolute advantage does not consider these differences. In most 
cases comparative advantage succeeds to explain why production is specialized among 
countries. (Houck 1986, 15.) 
 
 
The gains attained from international exchange and specialization together define the total 
gains from trade. International exchange relates to the consumption gain and specializa-
tion to the production gain. (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 38.) Figure 11 illustrates how the 
gains are generated. Curve P is the production possibilities frontier of two goods, e.g. 
poultry and cattle. Production possibilities frontier shows all the possible production com-
binations in a country. The change in production is possible only if a new technology is 
Figure 11 Gains from trade (Just et al. 2004, Koo & Kennedy 2007). 
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introduced or increased recourses are available under autarky. (Just et al. 2004, 269). 
Curves C1 and C2 are indifference curves and show the consumption possibilities or the 
consumer utility. The autarky equilibrium is at point a where production possibilities 
frontier and consumers indifference curve intersect. At the autarky equilibrium a, the 
consumption indifference curve is C1. The tangents present the price relations of selected 
product bundles and are called terms of trade (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 17).  
Relaxing autarky and allowing international exchange, the country can specialize its pro-
duction and move along the production possibilities frontier. For instance a shift from 
point a to point b indicates that the country specializes in poultry production. The pro-
duction of poultry increases and the production of cattle decreases. Contrary if country 
moves from point a to point d it specializes to produce more cattle than poultry. On the 
consumption side, the consumption indifference curve moves from C1 to C2 as a result of 
international exchange. Consumption possibilities increase to point c if the country spe-
cializes to produce poultry or to point e if the country specializes to produce cattle.  
International exchange leads to higher level of social utility as a consequence of access 
to foreign goods and wider consumption opportunities. Furthermore, increased interna-
tional competition tend to decrease commodity prices and thus, increase consumption 
possibilities of domestic consumers. (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 95.) Specialization and trade 
allow countries to produce beyond national production constraints and provide more ex-
ports to the world market. This improves total world efficiency and welfare. In country 
level, exports increase national income and welfare, stimulate investments and improve 
overall economy. (Suranovic 2010, 290−293; Just et al. 2004, 270; Houck 1986, 15.) 
 
4.2. International trade equilibrium 
 
Differences in prices form the basis for international exchange between countries. Inter-
national exchange occurs as long as price differences exist (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 17). 
International trade equilibrium can be derived from domestic demand (D) and supply (S) 
schedules. Demand curve shows the quantity demanded by consumers and supply curve 
the quantity supplied by producers (Mankiw & Taylor 2006, 87). Consider two countries 
a and b shown in Figure 12. Country a is an importing country and b is an exporting 
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country. Domestic demand and supply schedules are used to derive the international mar-
ket equilibrium in the middle of Figure 12. In autarky, trade equilibrium for country a is 
at the intersect of lines Da and Sa and for country b at the intersect of lines Db and Sb . 
Equilibrium price in autarky is P0 which is higher in country a than in country b.   
Figure 12 International trade equilibrium under free trade. (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 85). 
 
When free trade is allowed, the international trade equilibrium is found at point E where 
export supply (ES) and excess demand (ED) lines intersect and price equals the world 
market price Pw. In importing country a, the domestic market price for imported good 
decreases to world market level Pw. In exporting country b the domestic market price for 
exported good increases to the world market level Pw. Excess demand is referred as an 
import demand because it occurs when domestic demand for a good is greater than its 
domestic supply at a given price. Export supply is referred as excess supply and occurs 
when domestic supply is greater than domestic demand at a given price. The trade volume 
in international markets equals the exports of country b and imports of country a. (Koo 
& Kennedy 2007, 79−81.) 
 
4.3. Import demand 
 
A country produces a certain amount of a commodity at a given price level and consumes 
a certain amount of a commodity at a given price level. If excess demand takes place, the 
country wants to consume more than its domestic producers are able to supply. In this 
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case the country can buy this commodity from foreign markets. Thus, an excess demand 
is the amount the country wants to import into its domestic markets.  
A country has import demand when the amount of the commodity demanded at the given 
price is greater than the amount supplied at that price level. The import demand function 
can be defined as follows: 
  Qm (P) = Qd (P) − Qs (P) 
, where Qm (P) is the quantity of a commodity imported at price level P, Qd (P) the quantity 
of a commodity demanded at price level P domestically and Qs(P) the quantity if a com-
modity supplied domestically. One can note that import demand is linked to the domestic 
price level and changes in this price leads to change in import demand. This is because 
domestic demand and supply depend on the price level (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 79−80).  
According to the theory, decrease in price level leads to a decrease in domestic supply 
but simultaneously increase in domestic demand. Thus, the country faces excess demand 
and can satisfy it by importing more.  So, a decrease in domestic price leads to an increase 
in import demand. Contrary, an increase in price causes the domestic production to in-
crease but domestic consumption to decrease. As a consequence, the country imports less 
which means decreased import demand. One can note that the relation between import 
demand and price level is inverse. (Krugman et al. 2015, 239−240, Koo & Kennedy 2007, 
80) 
Figure 13 illustrates a partial equilibrium framework for import demand. Equilibrium in 
domestic markets is found at point E where domestic demand D intersects with domestic 
supply S at price level PE. Import demand in the equilibrium E is at point G and one can 
see that the quantity for import demand is at zero. Let the price level decrease from PE to 
P1. The supply line S shows the reaction of domestic production which decreases to the 
point Q1. Reaction of domestic consumption can be seen by following the demand line D. 
Domestic demand increases to point Q2. Now there is an excess demand in the domestic 
markets which is the area between Q1 and Q2. The import demand schedule is found now 
at point F at price level P1 and equals amount QED*. If the price level increases the reaction 
is inverse. 
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4.4. Economic integration 
 
Economic integration is a case where two or more countries agree on common trade rules 
in order to free trade in products and services (Houck 1986, 151; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 
167). It is a process aiming to abolish discrimination between economies. Economic in-
tegration has various forms depending on the level of integration (Balassa 1961, 174; see 
pages 6−8). Third way, according to Snorrason (2012; 13−25) is to define economic in-
tegration as a process of increasing welfare of a country through measurable elimination 
of trade costs which can be accomplished for instance through tariff reductions.  
The first definition is, to some extent, narrow as it directs the attention to trade rules, 
neglecting the political or other aspects of regional trade agreements. The second defini-
tion pays attention to the different degrees of integration, albeit Balassa (1961, 174−175) 
notes a difference between economic integration and economic cooperation. Economic 
integration refers purely to trade barrier reductions while cooperation includes further 
policy adjustments. The third definition is similar to the first one, but introduces the aspect 
of welfare economics in context of economic integration. The welfare effects of economic 
integration has been studied widely and used to justify regional trade agreements through-
out their history (Snorrason 2012, 2, 13−14). 
Figure 13 Partial equilibrium framework for import demand (Krugman et al. 2015, 240). 
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4.4.1. Trade creation and trade diversion  
 
The theory of economic integration was introduced first by Jacob Viener in 1950 who 
created the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion caused by regional integration. 
Trade creation refers to a situation where lower cost imports from a trading partner re-
place domestic production. On the other words, the location of production changes from 
a higher cost country to a lower cost country. This is seen to increase economic welfare. 
Trade diversion occurs when higher cost imports from a trading partner replace lower 
cost imports. Thus, the location of production changes from a lower cost country to a 
higher cost country. This is seen to decrease the level of overall economic welfare. 
(Snorrason 2012; 2, 14.) Such effects are used to judge the desirability of RTAs in mul-
tilateral trading system. It is commonly accepted that trade agreements increase trade and 
welfare among trading partners but in some cases may have negative effects to the trading 
system (Pal 2004, 9−11; Lipsey 1971, 46). Inter alia, Panagariya (1999, 9) notes that wel-
fare gains result from trade creation and welfare losses from trade diversion. 
Assume there are three countries A, B and C which trade poultry meat. Country A and B 
are high cost producers while country C is a low cost producer of poultry meat. At the 
starting point, country A imports poultry meat mainly from country C.  Country A has 
imposed a tariff (t) for poultry meat imports when the total price (p) for imported poultry 
meat is p + t for both partner countries. Then, country A and B agree on a bilateral trade 
agreement and tariff level for poultry meat is set to zero. Country C is left outside the 
agreement facing the initial tariff level t. As a consequence of economic integration, coun-
try A begins to import poultry meat from country B although the price without the tariff 
is higher than the price for country C with the tariff. This shift in imports from a low-cost 
producer to a high-cost producer is called trade diversion (Houck 1986, 154; Koo & Ken-
nedy 2007, 175).  
In a similar way the third country C could be considered as world markets when the world 
market price is lower in comparison to the internal market prices for poultry meat in 
countries A and B. In this situation, country A has imported poultry meat, let say, from 
world markets but after the bilateral trade agreement the tariff for country B is eliminated. 
Even though the world market price is lower with the tariff than the price in country B 
without the tariff, Country A increases imports from country B and reduces imports from 
world markets. In the perspective of third countries, trade diversion occurs but at the same 
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time the increase in trade between the country A and B is a sign of trade creation. Figure 
14 illustrates the aforementioned effects of trade creation and diversion. 
 
 
Figure 14 Trade creation and trade diversion effects (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 176) 
 
In Figure 14 the line SA is poultry meat supply and DA poultry meat demand in importing 
country A. All poultry meat imports to country A face the price line p + t before countries 
A and B establish a RTA. This price line p + t represent also the supply of poultry meat 
for country B with the tariff SB+tariff. The lower line represents the price p without the 
tariff and equals the supply SB for country B after the tariff elimination. Line ef equals the 
imports of country A under the tariff and line ij equals imports without the tariff. After 
signing a bilateral trade agreement the initial price level p + t for poultry meat imports 
from country B decrease to p. This leads to an increase in trade volume which equals the 
area ig plus hj. This increase in trade volume after signing a RTA is called trade creation 
(Houck 1986, 155). Similarly, trade diversion can be illustrated as a contrary effect in 
Figure 14. When the third country faces a tariff set by a trading block the volume traded 
decreases the area ig plus hj and the imported amount equals the area ef.  
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4.5. Impact of some trade restrictions 
 
4.5.1. Import tariffs 
 
A tariff or a custom duty is a tax set on merchandised commodities which cross national 
borders. Tariffs are used to protect domestic producers from foreign competition and are 
the oldest way to restrict trade. Domestically produced commodities gain price advantage 
over similar commodities with foreign origin as tariffs cause an additional cost to imports. 
Tariffs create a gap between the world prices and domestic prices because they make 
commodities more expensive outside the country. The tax for imports or exports is reve-
nue to the government. In the past, tariffs were a large source of government revenue to 
many nations. (WTO 2016; Krugman et al. 2016, 164−166, 239; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 
98; Houck 1986, 45−50.)  
A tariff can be applied in different ways. An ad valorem tariff is a certain fixed percent 
of the value of traded commodities. Equation form for an ad valorem tariff can be written 
as follows:  t = αV, where t indicates the amount of a tariff, α is the tariff rate in percentage 
term and V is the value of the commodities. Thus the price or value of traded goods de-
fines how large the tariff eventually will be. Ad valorem tariff provides same level of 
protection for all traded commodities under inflationary periods or if the price level 
changes. Ad valorem tariffs are most often applied to unprocessed goods or raw materials 
because their value is easy to determine. (Krugman et al. 2015, 238−239; Snorrason 2012, 
28; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 98)  
A specific tariff is a fixed charge of each unit of traded commodity and contrary to ad 
valorem tariff, the size of a tariff remains the same even though the price of a commodity 
changes. In equation form specific tariff can be written: t = c, where t is the amount of a 
tariff and c is a fixed charge. The protection of a specific tariff varies as the price changes. 
When the price level of a commodity rises the protection declines and when the price 
level goes down the protection increases. A specific tariff is mostly used for manufactured 
commodities. A compound tariff combines ad valorem and specific tariffs. The equation 
form for a compound tariff is t = c + αV. (Krugman et al. 2015, 238−239; Snorrason 
2012, 28−29; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 98) 
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Figure 15 Impact of a tariff in case of large economies. (Krugman et al. 2015, 242). 
 
Partial equilibrium framework for the impact of a tariff is shown in Figure 15. Country 
(a) is an importing country and Country (b) is an exporting country. There is an excess 
demand in Country (a) and excess supply in Country (b). At the starting point, the com-
modity price level is at world price level Pw in both countries and the quantity exchanged 
is Qw. The excess demand in Country (a) is satisfied by importing from Country (b). In-
ternational markets found their equilibrium at point 1 where excess supply ES equals 
excess demand ED. 
After introducing a tariff, the price level moves to point Pt and the quantity exchanged to 
point Qt. A tariff creates a price gap between the two markets as in Country (a) the price 
increases and Country (b) faces lower price level. Furthermore as a reaction to higher 
prices in Country (a), the quantity supplied increases but contrary the quantity demanded 
decreases. In international markets the excess demand ED decreases and moves to point 
2. In Country (b) the drop in price level leads to decrease in quantity supplied and increase 
in quantity demanded. Thus, the export supply moves to point 3. One can see that the 
overall amount traded declines after imposing a tariff. Increased imports will take place 
only after the domestic price exceeds the foreign market price at least with the amount of 
a tariff. (Krugman et al. 2015, 241−242.) 
Even though general tariff levels for industrialized goods in the EU−US trade is low, 
agricultural tariffs for some products are still high. Some agricultural tariffs between the 
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EU and the US are listed in table 2. The EU has very high tariffs for dairy, meat and sugar 
which implicates the sensitivity of the sectors. For the US, the import tariffs are high for 
dairy and sugar. The tariff for tobacco is also high in both countries. The explanation for 
this is its negative externality for human health rather than the sensitivity or the product.  
 
Table 2 Some average agricultural tariff levels for the US and the EU. WTO Statistics 
2015. 
Product category 
Average tariff (%) 
US EU 
Dairy 20.5 53.9 
Tobacco 21.8 22.4 
Sugar 18.7 24.3 
Meat 4.2 45.1 
Vegetables and fruits 4.7 10.7 
Oils and fats 7.3 6.1 
Processed products including 
  
Meat 2.4 19.5 
Vegetables 7.6 18.4 
Grains 5.8 8.5 
 
4.5.2. Import quotas 
 
An import quota is a limit on the quantity of a commodity that can be imported from 
foreign markets during a certain period of time. Import quotas has a strong distortion 
effect on trade and are much more efficient policy tools in comparison to tariffs. Quotas 
are used in protective manner and with quotas, the protected domestic sector can be insu-
lated from the world markets. However this kind of practice leads to inefficient use of 
resources and inefficient consumption of protected commodity. After GATT Uruguay 
Round all quotas became subject to tariffication which meant that quotas were to be elim-
inated or converted to tariffs. (WTO 2016b & 2004; Krugman et al 2015, 252; Koo & 
Kennedy 2007, 113; Houck 1986, 50.)  
Import quota can be unilateral or bilateral/multilateral. Unilateral quota is put on place by 
an importing country without negotiating with other countries. This type of quota system 
can be global or allocated. Global quota restricts imports from all countries while allo-
cated quota limits imports from certain countries. Contrary to unilateral quota, bilat-
eral/multilateral quota is negotiated between trading partners. The latter is seen more de-
sirable as trading partners can affect the establishment of the quota and thus the possible 
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trade effects for other countries might become smaller. (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 113.) One 
must note that a quota does not necessarily have effects on trade and prices unless it be-
comes binding. To become binding, a quota must restrict the imports below the level that 
would take place in the conditions of free trade during the determined time period (Houck 
1986, 50).  
 
 
 
The partial equilibrium framework in Figure 16 illustrates the impacts of a binding quota. 
At the starting point domestic supply S and domestic demand D intersect with the world 
price line P1. These intersections show domestic quantity supplied and demanded. One 
can see that there is excess demand in the domestic markets. Before any trade policy 
measures, the world price level is P1 and quantity of imports from international markets 
Q1. Then, an importing country decides to introduce a quota to level Q2. The quota 
changes the excess demand curve ED to ED* which is a vertical line. This is because Q2 
is the amount imported at any world price level that is below point d. The domestic price 
rises to level P2 and the world market price falls to level P3.  The domestic production 
reacts by increasing supply while domestic consumption decreases. This leads to decrease 
in imports. (Houck 1986, 50−51.)  
Figure 16 Effects of an import quota in case of a large country (Houck 1986, 51). 
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The effects of a quota seem quite similar to tariffs but there are a few distinctive charac-
teristics. First of all, quotas are not a source of government revenue and second, a quota 
restricts the amount a commodity can be imported unlike tariffs. Quotas are enforced by 
admitting import licenses for example to firms which can import the restricted good from 
foreign markets to domestic markets. The license holder receive the revenue by buying 
the good from cheaper foreign markets and then to sell it in domestic markets with higher 
prices. These profits that the import license holder receives are called quota rents. It must 
also be noted that with tariffs the domestic price and the world market price differ only 
the amount of a tariff but in quota system there is no limit of how much the price differ-
ence can be. (Krugman et al. 2015, 256; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 117.) 
 
4.5.3. Tariff-rate quota 
 
A tariff-rate quota (TRQ) is a combination of a tariff and a quota. TRQs are used to protect 
domestic production alike tariffs and quotas but the effect is weaker. The idea for TRQ is 
that a country sets certain tariff for a commodity but introduces a quota which is subject 
to lower or zero tariff level. Imports exceeding the quota are subject to the initial tariff 
level. TRQs may exclude some countries and thus in those cases they are discriminatory. 
They also require accounting systems and the follow up might be burdensome. (WTO 
2016b; FAS 2016; Koo & Kennedy 2007, 120.)  
Figure 17 shows the partial equilibrium framework for TRQs. International markets are 
in equilibrium in intersection of export supply ES and export demand ED lines. At this 
point the quantity traded is Q1 at world price level P1. Consider that an importing country 
imposes a tariff. For this reason, the export supply line shifts from ES to ES*. As ex-
plained in the tariff section, the domestic price level in importing country rises (Pm) and 
the price in exporting country falls (Px). Quantity traded declines to point Q2. Further-
more, the importing country increases market access by introducing a duty free tariff-rate 
quota until point Q3. Duty free refers to a tariff which equals zero. All imports up to the 
quantity of the quota (Q3) can enter the markets without additional costs. When the quota 
becomes binding the exceeding imports are subject to the initial tariff level. The excess 
supply curve follows the initial export supply curve ES until the quota becomes binding 
and becomes vertical in the quota ceiling and finally continues to follow ES*. (Koo & 
Kennedy 2007, 120−121) 
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The use of TRQs became frequent after the GATT Uruguay Round because a transition 
mechanism was needed to cope with the tariffication requirement. Most of the TRQs 
originate from that time. In addition to the TRQs which were established as a consequence 
of the tariffication requirement, WTO allowed a possibility to its members to establish 
autonomous TRQs as a tool to stabilize domestic markets in case of occasional production 
failure. TRQs are also commonly used in regional trade agreements to increase market 
access to trading partners. (WTO 2016b; FAS 2016).  
The EU applies a TRQ for poultry imports from the US which has been expanded in 
recent years. Explanation for the expansion is the GATT Article XXIV:6 which obliges 
a customs union in case of enlargement to pay compensation to other WTO members 
(GATT 1994). To reduce the additional cost caused by a tariff increase as a consequence 
of the EU enlargement in 2004, the EU and the US signed a bilateral enlargement com-
pensation agreement. New TRQs were introduced and expansion of existing TRQs for 
some agricultural commodities including poultry meat were agreed. (FAS 2016, Regula-
tion (EC) No 536/2007.) 
 
 
Figure 17 Impact of a tariff-rate quota in large country case (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 121). 
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4.5.4. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
 
According to WTO (1998) all measures intended to protect human or animal life from 
contaminants in food, measures to protect human life from diseases carried by plants or 
animals, measures to protect animal or plant life from pests or diseases, and measures to 
prevent or limit the entry or damage of pests in a country, are SPS measures. The nature 
of this type trade measures is complex as they in general are legitimate and intended to 
serve positive objectives. (Koo & Kennedy 2007, 132−133; Roberts et al. 2009, 4). SPS 
measures have become more contested as a consequence of a diminished impact of tariff 
measures as trade distortions. Houck (1986, 84) suggest that SPS measures become trade 
barriers when intended consistently and systemically restrict imports.  
The number of different SPS measures is endless which explains the difficulty and even 
unnecessity to determine only one framework to analyze the economic and welfare im-
pacts of these measures. In addition, the trade costs caused by SPS measures are both 
direct and indirect. Direct costs are easily measurable (e.g. increase in production cost per 
unit) but indirect costs are difficult to identify and quantify. A successful and credible 
evaluation of SPS measures requires understanding of the heterogeneity of these 
measures and throughout knowledge of the particular measure under scrutiny. The mini-
mum impact of a SPS measure can be nonexistent while at extreme foreign trade can be 
halted completely. The effects depend first of all on the burden of compliance and the 
nature of a SPS measure. 
 
4.5.4.1. Burden of compliance 
 
Referring to the burden of compliance, SPS measures can be categorized into specific, 
uniform or universal measures. Specific measures are targeted to one or more countries 
(country-specific) or to a particular product (product-specific). Specific measures have 
differential and undefined effects and they are seen more harmful for trade than uniform 
or universal measures. Specific regulation sets the targeted country or sector in to a dis-
advantaged trade position. Some countries may be more able to comply with specific 
regulation over others leading to a change in competition. (Josling et al. 2004, 21, 26−27; 
Houck 1986, 84.) Specific measures are commonly applied if a regional risk is present 
(Roberts et al. 1999, 11). For instance, some areas in the US have been subject to poultry 
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meat export bans because of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreaks. Another 
example of a regional ban is the BSE latency in some beef producing countries. 
Uniform measures are binding for all countries and thus both exports and imports are 
subject to the same regulation. In the simplest case, the economic effect can be derived 
from the additional compliance cost that have accrued to all producers in domestic and 
foreign markets. Likewise in the case of specific measures, some countries may have an 
advantage in complying with new regulations. The magnitude of compliance costs de-
pends on the difference between the initial domestic regulation and the new regulation. 
(Roberts et al. 1999, 10−11.) Uniform SPS measures are often set by international organ-
izations to streamline the rules for regulation between the countries and to improve the 
safety of internationally traded agro-food products. 
Universal measures apply only for imported goods, but not for exported goods. This 
means that the importing country sets a certain criteria for all imports aiming to cross the 
country’s border. Maximum Residue Level (MRL) is an example of one of the rare and 
acceptable universal measures. It applies for foreign substances that are used outside the 
importing country. It may though, apply for a known substance, but the MRL restricts the 
amount of the substance to an acceptable level. (Roberts et al. 1999, 10−11.) 
 
Table 3 The burden of compliance (After Roberts et al. 1999, 11). 
Measure Importing country Exporting country 
 
Specific 
 
No. Domestic regulations often 
equal requirements set on im-
ported goods. 
 
 
Yes. Exports must be compliant 
with the regulation in the import-
ing country. 
 
Uniform 
 
Yes. The cost of compliance is de-
termined by the difference before 
and after imposing a new regula-
tion. 
 
 
Yes. The cost of compliance is de-
termined by the difference before 
and after imposing a new regula-
tion. 
 
Universal 
 
No. Regulation is set by importing 
country towards all imported 
goods.  
 
Yes. All exports are subject to the 
regulation.  
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It is important to identify whether a SPS measure is specific, uniform or universal. This 
knowledge informs if the burden of compliance falls to the importing country, the export-
ing country or both. Table 3 shows how the burden of compliance is divided between the 
importing and exporting country in case of a specific, uniform and universal SPS measure 
(After Roberts et al. 1999, 11). One must bear in mind that eventually in all cases the 
burden of compliance vary between individual countries based on their ability to comply 
with the rules. As mentioned above, the ultimate cost of compliance is determined by the 
difference between the rules before and after the new regulation. 
A specific measure is set by the importing country and in most cases equals the domestic 
regulation. This causes no implicit burden of compliance to the importing country itself. 
Exporting country has to adapt to the new regulation and has to bear the burden of com-
pliance. Uniform measure causes the burden of compliance for both, to the importing and 
to the exporting country. Universal measure causes the same division of burden of com-
pliance between the importing and exporting country than a specific measure. The differ-
ence is that universal measure is binding for all countries while a specific measure only 
to a particular product or one or more countries.  
 
4.5.4.2. Nature of sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
 
The second categorization can be made referring to the nature of the SPS measures. It is 
possible to perceive three different types according to their economic effects on trade. 
These are cost-increasing, quantity-restricting and combining SPS measures. The cost-
increasing SPS measures refer to all formalities, paperwork, customs valuation or clear-
ance procedures, labelling requirements or any other additional obligatory requirement 
differing from the domestic practice that increase the trade costs. Roberts et al. (1999) 
and Josling et al. (2004) use the term “information remedies” to describe these measures. 
Agro-food trade involves asymmetric information about sanitary and phytosanitary risks 
and these formalities (e.g. customs inspections) are aimed at correcting the problem of 
insufficient knowledge.  
The trade effect of a cost-increasing SPS measure is to some extent similar to tariffs (for 
partial equilibrium, see p. 33.). The extinguishing characteristic is that the cost is not 
necessarily paid by the exporting country because the cost may be shared between the 
parties or even so that the importing country bear the total cost. The final impacts on trade 
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and domestic markets are determined by the magnitude and share of the final cost and the 
price difference between the exporting and the importing country. The economic impact 
of cost-increasing SPS measures is relatively easy to quantify. 
Second type, quantity-restricting SPS measures include any practice directly restricting 
market entry. In practice, these measures include bans for agro-food products that contain 
human, animal or plant health risk. The consequence can be total or partial ban in the 
sense of the duration and regional coverage (Josling et al. 2004, 22). For example, a dis-
ease outbreak in poultry meat production in the EU does not completely halt international 
trade. This occurs probably for one country or the infected territory where the outbreak 
takes place. Existing trade bans are caused e.g. by BSE latency in cattle and outbreaks of 
HPAI in poultry. Trade effects of such practices are comparable to quota (for partial equi-
librium see p. 35) and the quantification of economic effects can be made according to 
the loss in quantity traded if historical data is available. For complete ban, the trade di-
minishes to zero but for a partial ban, trade only diminishes to a certain level.  
The third type of sanitary and phytosanitary measures can be called as combining SPS 
measures. This is because the effect of these measures is equal to the effect of a cost-
increasing and a quantity restricting unless the producing country can circumvent the re-
quirements. And if so, it is supposed that the cost of production increases leading to higher 
market price. Production or safety standards are a common example of this kind of 
measures. Josling et al. (2004, 23) discuss that e.g. production standards are not trade 
restricting if an exporting country is willing to sacrifice additional resources to meet the 
specified standard in the importing country.  
Because comparative costs shift among producers within an exporting country not all 
producers are able to fulfill the conditions in the importing country. The increase in costs 
can be caused by investments to new technology or production facilities, increased in-
spections or any other practices that differ from the traditional domestic production meth-
ods. The costs of this kind of practices are often difficult to determine and quantify be-
cause both direct and indirect costs exist. Some reference can be drawn from earlier trade 
statistics, and of course, some benchmark for production costs can be taken from the 
country that applies the certain standard.  
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A simplistic partial equilibrium framework in Figure 18 outlines the trade effects of a 
combining SPS measure to importing country. Domestic demand curve is D, domestic 
supply curve is S, import demand curve when the SPS measure is efficient corresponds 
EDSPS and the price level is PSPS. At this price level import demand should equal QM*. 
Instead of this free trade situation, imports under differing production standards are illegal 
and thus import demand is now at QM1. The loss in quantity imported equals QM*− QM1. 
Note that there is also a shadow excess demand line ED for similar product produced 
under the requirements of the importing country. For this product, there is a correspond-
ing shadow price line P. The quantity imported equals Q because this product is not sub-
ject to the SPS measure.  
Figure 19 shows the trade effects of a combining SPS measure to exporting country. Do-
mestic demand curve is D, domestic supply is S, the export supply is ESSPS when the SPS 
measure is efficient and the corresponding price level is at Psps. At price level Psps export 
supply should equal QX*. Because the exported product does not fill the standards of the 
importing country, the exports are restricted to QM1 and equal zero. The loss in quantity 
exported equals QX*− QX1. Similarly than for importing country, the shadow export sup-
ply line ES shows the excess supply for a product produced under SPS conditions for 
importing country. The quantity exported equals Q corresponding the price level P. Note 
Figure 18 Importing country perspective. Effects of a combining SPS measure on 
trade (Following Roberts et al 1999). 
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that there is a price difference between the two products. Product produced according to 
the SPS measure has higher price level than the SPS non-compliant product.  
 
 
 
4.6. Elasticities 
 
It is typical for trade environment that market conditions and thus trade volumes change 
over time. These market conditions include for instance prices of commodities or their 
substitutes, exchange rates, income level and trade policy measures. It can be said that 
elasticities signal the behaviour of different actors in the markets. When scrutinizing elas-
ticities the underlying assumption of ceteris paribus is in force. This means that when one 
determinant (e.g. price) changes, all other remain equal. The above presented partial equi-
librium analyses considered direction of such changes but neglected exact changes in 
trade quantities. To be able to quantify sensitivity or exact responses of supply or demand 
to a change in a market condition, elasticities must be known. (Norwood & Lusk 2008, 
66; Mankiw & Taylor 2006, 87−88.) In the empirical part of this study, the most useful 
elasticities are own-price elasticities for supply and demand. Commonly used elasticities 
are introduced in the followings. 
 
Figure 19 Exporting country perspective. Effects of a combining SPS measure on trade 
(Following Roberts et al 1999). 
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Let there be dependent variable Y and independent variable X. Independent variable X 
effects the dependent variable Y. Elasticity can be used to find out how much dependent 
variable Y changes as a response of change in independent variable X. Elasticities are 
often measured in percentage terms and the elasticity value can be indicated as a ratio. In 
the percentage case, elasticities measure the magnitude of change in Y as a consequence 
of a certain percent change in X. Mathematically elasticities in percentage terms can be 
expressed as follows:  
    ε(Y, X) = 
%∆𝑌
%∆𝑋
 
where ε(Y,X) is the elasticity of Y in respect to X, %∆Y is the percentage change in Y and 
%∆X is the percentage change in X. (Norwood & Lusk 2008, 66−67; Mankiw & Taylor 
2006, 89.) For example, dependent variable Y could be demand for poultry meat and the 
independent variable price of poultry meat. This price elasticity would indicate how many 
percentage poultry meat demand changes if price of poultry meat changes one percentage.   
 
 
Figure 20 shows the difference between elastic and inelastic demand. Demand is said to 
be elastic if the value for elasticity of demand is greater than 1. The quantity demanded 
increases proportionately more than the price. If the value for elasticity is precisely 1, 
demand is unit elastic and the quantity changes proportionately as much as the price. 
Figure 20 Elastic and inelastic demand (Norwood & Lusk 2008, 69). 
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Demand is perfectly elastic if the elasticity value equals infinity. In partial equilibrium 
framework perfectly elastic demand curve is a horizontal line when a small change in 
price leads to a great change in demand. Elasticity is said to be inelastic if the value for 
elasticity is less than 1. This means that the quantity demanded changes proportionately 
less than the price. If the value of elasticity is zero, demand is perfectly inelastic and the 
quantity demanded does not react to price level changes. In partial equilibrium framework 
perfectly inelastic demand curve is a vertical line. (Norwood & Lusk 2008, 67−69; 
Mankiw & Taylor 2006, 90−92.) 
 
4.6.1. Different elasticities of demand 
 
Own-price elasticity of demand indicates the sensitiveness of quantity demanded to re-
spond to a change in price. In percentage terms that would indicate a percentage change 
in quantity demanded if price changes for example one percent. The theory of demand 
assumes that increase in price decreases the demand of a product. Thus, there is a nega-
tive relationship between the price and demand of a good and the elasticity of demand is 
assumed to be negative. (Norwood & Lusk 2008, 67−68; Mankiw & Taylor 2006, 
88−89.)  
Elasticity can also be calculated by using midpoint method. This means that the elasticity 
is calculated at certain point of the demand curve. In this case the demand curve is as-
sumed to be linear because in reality the elasticity varies in different points of the demand 
curve. Formula for calculating own-price elasticity of demand by using midpoint method 
is shown below (Norwood & Lusk 2008, 89). ED is the own-price elasticity of demand, 
Δ𝑄 is the change in quantity demanded, Δ𝑃 is the change in price, Q is the quantity and 
P is price. 
𝐸𝐷 =
Δ𝑄/𝑄
Δ𝑃/𝑃
= (
Δ𝑄
Δ𝑃
) (
𝑃
𝑄
) 
 
Another important elasticity for trade is the price elasticity of import demand. It measures 
how much the quantity imported changes as a consequence of a price change. Import 
demand is generally more sensitive to price changes than domestic demand. It is to say, 
the price elasticity of import demand is larger than that of domestic demand. This is ex-
plained by that an increase in world price leads to decrease in import demand, increase in 
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domestic supply and decrease in domestic consumption. The mathematical formula for 
elasticity of import demand can be expressed as follows: 
 
   εm =  
%∆𝑄𝑚
%∆𝑃
 = 
∆𝑄𝑚/𝑄𝑚
∆𝑃/𝑃
 = 
∆𝑄𝑚
∆𝑃
 * 
𝑃
𝑄𝑚
 
 
where εm denotes the elasticity of import demand, Qm is the quantity of the commodity 
imported, ∆Qm is the change in the quantity of the commodity imports. P stands for the 
price for the commodity and ∆P is the change in the commodity price. (Koo & Kennedy 
2007, 81−82; Houck 1986, 33−34) 
Income elasticity of demand shows how sensitive the quantity demanded is in relation to 
change in consumer income.  It is calculated by dividing the precentual change in quantity 
demanded by the precentual change in consumer income. Positive value for elasticity 
indicates the commodity to be a normal good because an increase in income level in-
creases the demand of that commodity. If income elasticity is a negative, the commodity 
is an inferior good as increase in income level decreases the demand of that good. (Nor-
wood & Lusk 2008, 49; Mankiw & Taylor 2006, 96−97.) In the case of poultry meat one 
could think that for some consumers beef is an inferior good. This is because the increase 
in income level tend to shift the consumption from cheaper poultry meat to more expen-
sive beef meat.  
To measure the changes in quantity demanded for one good in relation to change in price 
of other good one can calculate cross-price elasticity of demand. For substituting com-
modities the cross-price elasticity is positive because increase in the price of a commodity 
causes an increase in the demand of the substituting commodity. For complementary 
commodities, which are used together, the cross-price elasticity is negative as the increase 
in price of the commodity decreases the demand of the complementary commodity. Time 
horizon impacts the size of the cross-price and other elasticities as well. In the short run 
the elasticity tends to be small but in the long run the elasticity value becomes larger. This 
is due to the ability of the markets to adjust to price changes in the long run. (Norwood 
& Lusk 2008, 76−77; Mankiw & Taylor 2006, 97.)  
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5. Evaluation of the effects of a change in agricultural trade policy  
 
Partial equilibrium (PE) frameworks are widely used to analyze the effects of trade policy 
changes and economic integration. They are useful when examining aforementioned ef-
fects related to a specific product or a market. PE analysis is intelligible, easily remolded 
and provides distinctive outcomes for different policy changes.  Despite its various ad-
vantages PE analysis ignores the linkages between other sectors of the economy. (Niemi 
2004, 227.) The following partial equilibrium analysis is limited to examine one sector 
and changes in its domestic and international markets. The context is built around bilateral 
trade setting between the EU and the US. The analysis is influenced by the work made by 
Niemi (2004) who studied the static welfare effects of integration of the Finnish agricul-
tural markets to the EU. 
As described before, this partial equilibrium analysis is intended to clarify the present 
situation in the EU−US poultry meat trade and the outcome after a change in agricultural 
trade policy in the EU. In the theory section, sanitary and phytosanitary measures were 
classified in three different categories according to the nature of SPS measures. The case 
in the EU−US poultry meat falls in the category of combining SPS measures. The com-
bining measures are the most challenging ones to quantify and analyze. Thus, the follow-
ing partial equilibrium analysis is a pure simplification of reality.  
Allowing the trade for poultry meat produced using pathogen reduction treatments (PRT) 
is likely to have effects on both the importer and the exporter. Importing country is the 
European Union and exporting country is the United States. The importer and exporter 
views are presented separately. 
 
5.1. Effects on the EU 
 
Effects on the EU poultry meat market are presented graphically in Figure 21. In the left 
hand graph domestic demand curve is DEU and domestic supply curve is SEU for poultry 
meat. Right hand graph shows the EU’s import demand curve EDSPS for poultry meat 
under PRT conditions from the US. The domestic price when the SPS measure applies is 
at PSPS. At this price level the domestic production is at Q1 and domestic consumption is 
at C1. Note that C1−Q1 is the excess demand in domestic market and should the quantity 
   54 
   
of imports QM1
*
 in the right hand graph. When the SPS measure is in force the quantity 
of imports is QM1 which equals zero so no imports take place. There is a shadow excess 
demand line ED and its corresponding quantity Q at price P for the US poultry meat which 
is produced according to the EU requirements. This amount Q is currently imported to 
the EU. The line is below the EDSPS because the price for non-PRT poultry meat is lower 
than the EU market price. Note that in this point the US poultry meat produced under 
PRTs is not a perfect substitute to the non-PRT poultry meat. 
 
 
 
Now assume that the ban for pathogen reduction treated poultry meat is lifted. As an 
outcome of the RTA negotiations the imports are allowed to the EU. To simplify the 
analysis the domestic and imported poultry meat are now considered as perfect substi-
tutes. The domestic market price falls to level indicated by P. Reduction in the market 
price gives signal to domestic producers to cut the production and the quantity produced 
shifts to Q2. Consumers react by increasing consumption and the new quantity demanded 
in domestic market is at C2. Again the difference between Q2 and C1 show the excess 
demand which equals the amount QM2.  Thus, abolishing of the SPS measure leads to 
lower market price, decrease in domestic production and increase in consumption and 
thus increase in imports.  
Figure 21 Trade and welfare effects for the EU after accepting trade in chlorine washed 
poultry meat (Following Roberts et al 1999).  
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This kind of change in trade policy that leads to a wider market access have effects also 
on producer and consumer welfare. Consumer and producer surpluses are widely used in 
empirical studies to measure these welfare changes. Consumer surplus is the area between 
the price line and the demand curve. Producer surplus is the area between the price line 
and the supply curve. (Norwood & Lusk 2008, 41−46; Just et al. 2004, 98; Niemi 2005, 
228.) As shown in Figure 21, the consumer surplus increases by area a+b+c+d and pro-
ducer surplus decreases by area a. In the right hand graph the shadow lines can be ignored. 
The ban decreases consumer welfare by area e. After the ban is lifted, consumer welfare 
increase by the area e and also area f.  
 
5.2. Effects on the US  
 
Partial equilibrium framework for effects on US market are shown in Figure 22. Domestic 
demand curve is DUS and domestic supply curve is SUS for poultry meat in the left hand 
graph. Right hand graph shows the export supply curve ESSPS for US poultry meat exports 
to the EU. The price in the domestic US market for poultry meat produced under PRT 
conditions is at PSPS, remember that the SPS measure set by the EU is in force.  At this 
price level the domestic production is at Q1 and domestic consumption at C1. Now Q1−C1 
is the quantity of excess supply in the US domestic market and it should equal the quantity 
of exports QX1
*
 in the right hand graph. Instead the exports equal now QX1 because the 
US exports of poultry meat produced under PRT conditions are not allowed to the EU.  
 
Figure 22 Trade and welfare effects for the US after PRTs are allowed by the EU 
(Following Roberts et al 1999).  
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This means that the US exports equal zero. The shadow line ES and the corresponding 
quantity Q at price level P is the export supply line for poultry meat which is produced 
under compliance of EU regulations. This shadow line is there only to illustrate that some 
trade between the EU and the US takes place despite the SPS measure. The line is above 
the ESSPS because the compliance cost increases the price of production and thus leads to 
higher market price. 
Again, situation changes along the abolishment of the sanitary and phytosanitary meas-
ure. When the exports are allowed the exchanged quantity is first QX1
* with price level 
PSPS. As the markets are allowed to adjust, the price increases according to the price dif-
ference that exists between the EU and US markets. Lower US price faces a slight in-
crease and is found at P. Domestic producers increase their production while domestic 
consumers react by consuming less poultry meat. Excess supply increases to point QX2. 
Summing up, the trade policy change leads to a higher domestic market price, increase in 
domestic production, decrease in domestic consumption and increase in exports.  
After the restricting SPS measure is abolished, the producer surplus in the exporting coun-
try increase by area a+b+c while the consumer surplus decrease by area a+b. And looking 
at the right hand graph the welfare increases the area e+f (ignore the shadow lines for ES 
and Q). One can also note that the ban increases the welfare loss by area e. 
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6. Quantitative examination of the static welfare effects 
 
6.1. Estimation methodology 
 
Last section described the effects of the sanitary and phytosanitary measure on poultry 
meat trade between the EU and the US. The effects on importing and exporting country 
were presented using partial equilibrium framework analysis. Also changes in consumer 
and producer surpluses were discussed. This section proceeds to quantify the static wel-
fare effects on the EU poultry meat market when the SPS measure becomes ineffective. 
Various studies that attempt to measure changes in trade policies apply pragmatic Mar-
shallian concepts of economic surpluses (Niemi 2005, 227; Just et al. 2004, 98). This 
orientation, which is applied to this study as well, utilizes elasticities of supply and de-
mand to quantify welfare. Finally as a reminder, the effects are analyzed in bilateral trade 
context and the rest of the world or third party effects are ignored. 
 
6.2. Linear supply and demand curves 
 
Quantitative examination of changes in consumer and producer surpluses require 
knowledge of the demand and supply curves. Changes in international market are derived 
through the domestic supply and demand schedules. Changes in consumer and producer 
welfare are computed by comparing the welfare level before and after the trade policy 
change. The model for domestic poultry meat markets is developed by using three varia-
bles which are necessary when one product is under examination. The variables are quan-
tity demanded Qd, quantity supplied Qs and product price P. The EU poultry meat market 
is defined by using demand (6.1) and supply (6.2) functions. Product price is determined 
as a function of quantity demanded and quantity supplied: 
6.1   𝑃𝑑 = 𝐷(𝑄) 
6.2  𝑃𝑠 = 𝑆(𝑄) 
First assumption for the model is the linearity of demand (6.3) and supply (6.4) func-
tions. Linearity is often assumed to simplify the analysis. Second assumption is that of 
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decreasing demand curve and increasing supply curve. This holds as after the first deriv-
atives of 6.3 and 6.4 are D’(Q) < 0 and S’(Q) > 0. (Simon & Blume 1994, 16−19, 
58−59, 64−68.)  
 
6.3  𝑃𝑑 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑄𝑑 where 𝑎1 < 0 
6.4 𝑃𝑠 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑄𝑠 where 𝑏1 > 0  
 
6.3. Consumer and producer surplus 
 
 
Pragmatic Marshallian economic surplus measures are used to capture changes in welfare 
for consumers and producers. Consumer and producer surplus in case of linear supply 
and demand curves are illustrated in Figure 23.  Consumer surplus is the net value for 
consumers as a group due to a change in market price. Decrease in market price benefits 
consumers because the new price is lower than the highest price the consumers are willing 
to pay and vice versa. Graphically presented, consumer surplus (CS) is the triangular area 
between the price line (p) and the demand curve (Pd = a0 + a1Qd). In this study, consumer 
surplus is measured by monetary value even though consumer welfare is affected by non-
measurable factors such as consumer preferences (see e.g. Just et al. 2004). 
Figure 23 Consumer and producer surplus with linear demand and supply curves (e.g. 
Krugman et al. 2015, 244−249). 
   59 
   
Producer surplus is the net value for producers caused by a change in the supply price. 
Decrease in price decrease the value of producer surplus and an increase in price increases 
the value of producer surplus. Producer surplus (PS) is the triangular area between the 
price line (p) and the supply curve (Ps = b0 + b1Qs) in Figure 23. (Krugman et al. 2015, 
244−249, Just et al. 2004 49−55, 98−102; Houck 1984, 52−54.) Producer surplus (6.5) 
and consumer surplus (6.6) can be calculated by using the following formula: 
6.5  PS = 0,5 ∗ [(Pe − b0) ∗ Qe] 
6.6 CS = 0,5 ∗ [(a0 − Pe) ∗ Qe] 
 
6.4. Elasticities  
 
To be able to define the welfare effects, demand and supply elasticities must be known 
(Niemi 2004, 229). There is a lack of sufficient and up-to-date own-price-elasticity esti-
mates for poultry meat demand and supply in the EU. Some medium term own-price 
elasticities for poultry meat are summarized in table 4. Okrent & Alson (2012, 20) have 
estimated own-price elasticities for various products in the US. For poultry meat the ob-
tained valued for own-price-elasticity of demand was −0.81. Huang’s (1993, 22) estimate 
for own-price-elasticity for chicken meat demand was −0.37. It must be noted that this 
estimate is from the early 1990s and is not fully comparable to the conditions in 2013. 
The report from FAO (2003, 48−50) describes estimates for the US and Canada but these 
estimates are also from the 1990s. FAO’s report shows that estimates of own-price elas-
ticity of demand for Canada was −0.65, and for the US −0.95. 
 
Table 4 Some medium term own-price elasticity of poultry meat demand estimates  
Author Year  Estimate Country 
Okrent & Alson  2012  −0.81 US  
FAO  2003  −0.65 Canada 
−0.95 US 
Eales &Hyde & Schrader  1998  −0.52 US 
Huang  1993  −0.37 US 
Own calculation       2013  −0.37 EU 
Average    −0.61 
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Eales, Hyde and Schrader (1998) conclude that in 11 studies made during the 1990s the 
average own-price elasticity for poultry or chicken meat demand in the US was −0.52. 
Because of this variety, own-price elasticity of poultry meat demand was calculated by 
using values of EU consumption and prices from year 2012 and 2013 by using the formula 
described on page 45 of this study. The elasticity obtained was −0.37 which equals 
Huang’s estimate. This study utilizes calculated average elasticity, which became −0.61 
based on aforementioned findings. 
 
The own-price elasticities of poultry meat supply are presented in Table 5. Tiffin et al. 
(2011) has calculated own-price elasticity of supply in the UK and obtained value 0.90. 
Bhati’s (1987) estimate for own-price elasticity of supply in Australia was 1.19. The own 
calculation for the price elasticity of supply in 2012−2013 was 0.15 which is significantly 
lower than the other elasticities. The average of the elasticities is 0.73 and is utilized in 
the calculations. Own-price elasticities for both demand and supply are inelastic referring 
that the change in quantity is relatively smaller than the change in price. 
 
Table 5 Some medium term own-price elasticity of poultry meat supply estimates  
Author Year  Estimate Country 
Tiffin et al.  2011  0.90 UK  
Bhati 1987  1.19 Australia 
Own calculation 2013  0.15 EU 
Average    0.73 
 
6.5. Data 
 
The data was obtained from the statistical office of the European Union Eurostat. Eurostat 
is a useful source for the newest data on production, prices and consumption in the Euro-
pean Union member countries. Trade data and data concerning the US poultry meat mar-
kets was obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture USDA. USDA pro-
vides also statistics related to the European Union. USDA has historical trade data which 
covers trade with all the European countries while Eurostat has incomplete historical data 
on all present member countries. Supplementary data was obtained from FAOSTAT 
which is the Statistics Division of FAO. FAOSTAT provides data for both the US and the 
EU. Thus it provides a good source to compare data collected from different sources.    
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7. Results 
 
In 1997, the European Union established a sanitary and phytosanitary measure which laid 
down the conditions for imported poultry meat. This measure required that water is the 
only substance used for treating poultry meat sold in the EU markets. The aim of the SPS 
measure was and still is to ensure that no hazardous pathogens exist in poultry meat. After 
this measure became effective, poultry meat imports from the US plummeted. The reason 
fort this is the routinely used pathogen reduction treatments in the US poultry meat pro-
duction.  
The US is trying to resolve the SPS matter through trade agreement with the EU. Even 
though the ongoing TTIP negotiations do not cover PRTs, the trade agreement creates an 
environment for the future discussions in SPS matters. The aim of the empirical part of 
the study was to quantify the possible changes in welfare on the EU domestic poultry 
meat market caused by a change in trade policy regime. More precisely, the change would 
consider that the SPS measure of PRTs became ineffective.  
The calculations proceed as follows: 1) supply and demand equations are defined to be 
able to calculate the equilibrium price and quantity in the present policy regime. After 
having defined equilibrium values, consumer and producer surpluses can be calculated, 
2) the producer price is manipulated to represent the conditions in the new trade policy 
regime. The equations defined in the first stage are then used to calculate new quantities 
for production and consumption. After this consumer and producer surpluses can be de-
fined in the new trade policy regime, 3) obtained results are compared with each other. 
The base year of the analysis was calendar year 2013. The quantity of poultry meat pro-
duced and consumed covers broiler and turkey meat of which broiler meat is the domi-
nating category. The quantity produced was 12 675 314 tons and the quantity demanded 
12 287 000 tons in 2013. The producer price was 127.3 per 100 kg while the consumer 
price was 194.9 € per 100 kg. The EU imported poultry meat from the US 200 tons and 
exported 600 tons to the US. Note that the consumer price was higher than the EU pro-
ducer price. However, the consumer price in the US was 173.10 €/100 kg in 2013 which 
was 21.8 € lower than in the EU. The imported poultry meat from the US was produced 
according to the EU standards. The average producer price from the EU-28 was the price 
measure utilized in the calculations to obtain the demand and supply functions. More 
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precise calculations of the equations and the welfare measures are presented in the appen-
dix 1 and 2. Utilizing the data described above the equations for supply (7.1) and demand 
(7.2) were defined: 
 
 
7.1 𝑃𝑠 =  −470.98 + 0.00014(𝑄𝑠) 
7.2 𝑃𝑑 =  3360.94 −  0.00017(𝑄𝑑) 
 
7.1. Effects of a change in agricultural trade policy 
 
At the starting point of the analysis, economic welfare measures were calculated for the 
existing policy regime where the EU applies the SPS measure which prohibits the use 
PRTs in poultry meat. Table 6 shows the results of the calculations. At the present system, 
consumer surplus amounted 13.2 billion euro and producer surplus 10.9 billion euro. 
Thus, total economic welfare amounted 23.9 billion euro.  
 
Table 6 The effects of a change in trade policy (−20% in producer price) 
  SPS effective SPS ineffective Change (%) 
 Quantity supplied (ton)            12 675 314               10 824 718 −14.6 
 Quantity demanded (ton)            12 287 000               13 786 014 +12.2 
        
 Producer surplus (€)     10 684 238 466       8 062 810 595 −24.5 
 Consumer surplus (€)     13 190 141 854     16 144 945 636 +22.4 
 Total welfare (€)    23 874 380 320      24 207 756 231  +1.4 
    
 
At the second stage, it was assumed that the EU would abolish the SPS measure and allow 
trade in PRT poultry meat from the US. For this reason, the EU producer price was de-
creased by 20% from 1273.4€/ton to 1018.72€/ton. The decrease in the producer price 
caused the production of poultry meat to decrease by 1.9 million tons (14.6%) in the EU. 
Simultaneously, the quantity demanded increased by 1.5 million tons (12.2%). These 
changes caused the consumption to exceed production in the EU. The import demand for 
the EU reached 3.0 million tons.  
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Welfare calculations showed that consumer surplus increased from 13.2 billion to 16.1 
billion euro. In comparison to the present system, consumer surplus increased by 22.4%. 
Because consumption possibilities were not restricted, welfare for the EU consumers in-
creased. In contrary, producer welfare decreased from 10.7 billion to 8.1 billion euro 
which is 24.5% less than in the present system. Total economic welfare increased from 
23.9 billion euro to 24.2 billion euro which is 1.4% more than when the SPS measure is 
effective.  
The results indicate that the change in trade policy regime would benefit the consumers 
but harm the producers in the EU. What is more, the net welfare for the poultry meat 
market in the EU increased. This indicates that the SPS measure applied currently by the 
EU causes a deadweight loss for the society.  However, it was assumed in the calculations 
that the poultry meat produced under compliance of the EU regulations would be a perfect 
substitute for the poultry meat produced under the PRT conditions. This assumption sim-
plified the quantification of the surplus measures but in the reality the case might be dif-
ferent. This is explained by consumer preferences. Many of the European consumers may 
value the poultry meat produced under the EU regulation higher than the pathogen reduc-
tion treated poultry meat. In the other words, the European consumers might be willing 
to pay more to be able to consume the poultry meat produced under the EU regulations. 
Thus, it is possible that the SPS measure actually increase the consumer welfare.  
This analysis assumes that the imports from the US would increase approximately by 3.0 
million tons. As described earlier in the study, there is a tariff-rate quota of 16 665 tons 
for imported poultry meat from the US. This trade policy measure would restrict trade 
and leave the effects rather small unless the existing TRQ was extended or abolished. If 
the import demand for the EU (or the excess supply for the US) totalled 3.0 million tons, 
it would affect the US market for poultry meat. The reactions in the US markets to this 
change would include an increase in the producer price causing the quantity produced to 
increase. Consumer price would rise leading to a decrease in consumption. This means 
that the producers would be better off and consumers worse off in the US. More precise 
quantification or analysis of these effects on US poultry meat market is not made in this 
study.  
In the following section, the above presented analysis is referred as base analysis.  
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7.2. Sensitivity analysis 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis was carried out to examine the effect of changed elasticity values to 
consumer and producer surpluses. Such analysis is reasonable especially when present 
information of elasticity values is insufficient. The first sensitivity analysis was calculated 
with reduced elasticity values which means that the elasticities became more inelastic. 
The new own-price elasticity of supply valued 0.61 (−0.12 units) and the own-price elas-
ticity of demand −0.49 (+0.12 units). Other parameters remained unchanged. New equa-
tions for supply (7.5) and demand (7.6) were defined: 
 
7.5.  𝑃𝑠 =  −814.14 + 0.00016(𝑄𝑠) 
7.6.  𝑃𝑑 =  3872.18 − 0.00021(𝑄𝑑) 
 
Calculation results are shown in Table 7. The first sensitivity analysis show that the pro-
duction of poultry meat in the EU decreased by 12.2% which is 2.4% less in comparison 
the base analysis. Consumption increased by 9.8% which is 2.4% less than in the base 
analysis. It can be noted that replacing the own-price elasticities with more inelastic val-
ues, production and supply react more moderately to change in price than in the base 
analysis.  
 
Table 7 The effects of a change in trade policy with elasticities changed 
  SPS effective SPS ineffective Change (%) 
 Quantity supplied (ton)            12 675 314               11 128 926 − 12.2 
 Quantity demanded (ton)            12 287 000               13 491 126 + 9.8 
        
 Producer surplus (€)     12 778 297 730      10 198 886 845 −20.2 
 Consumer surplus (€)     16 410 417 354     19 248 163 912 +17.3 
 Total welfare (€)    29 188 715 084      29 447 050 757  +0.9 
    
 
Consumer surplus increased from 16.4 billion to 19.2 billion euro (+17.3%) which is 
5.1% less than in the base analysis. Producer surplus decreased from 12.8 billion to 10.2 
billion euro (−20.2%). This decrease was 4.3% smaller in comparison to the base analysis. 
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Total economic welfare increased from 29.2 billion to 29.4 billion euro. Thus, total wel-
fare increased by 0.9% which is 0.5% less than in the base analysis. The overall welfare 
level is higher in the sensitivity analysis than in the base analysis. However, the results 
do not deviate significantly between the base analysis and the first sensitivity analysis.  
 
Similar sensitivity analysis was done by using various combinations of supply and de-
mand elasticities to better clarify the impact of manipulated elasticities on the results. 
Table 8 summarizes the main findings. When own-price elasticity of supply valued 1.19 
and demand −0.37, consumer surplus increased by 13.7% and producer surplus decreased 
by 39.1%. Total welfare increased by 1.5%. Producer surplus decreased significantly 
more than in earlier analyses. Consumer surplus increased less than in the earlier analysis. 
Total welfare increased only 0.1% more than in the base analysis. 
 
 
Table 8 The effects of a change in trade policy with elasticities changed 
  SPS effective SPS ineffective 
Change in 
% 
Es = 1.19, Ed = −0.37    
CS (€)          21 454 247 195            24 388 637 959    13.7 
PS (€)            6 466 289 948              3 937 826 324    −39.1 
Total welfare (€)          27 920 537 144            28 326 464 283    1.5 
    
Es = 0.12, Ed = −0.95    
CS (€)            8 701 812 338            11 661 408 947    34.0 
PS (€)          66 778 891 226            64 063 692 350    −4.1 
Total welfare (€)          75 480 703 564            75 725 101 297    0.3 
    
Es = 0.45, Ed = −1.1    
CS (€)            7 431 570 057            10 585 410 008    42.4 
PS (€)          17 609 534 639            14 851 278 676    −15.7 
Total welfare (€)          25 041 104 697            25 436 688 683    1.6 
 
In the second case, the used value of own-price elasticity of supply was 0.15 and for 
demand 0.95. Elasticity of supply was highly inelastic and elasticity of demand near unit 
elasticity. The results show that producer surplus decreased only by −5.2% while con-
sumer surplus increased by 40.9%. The small change in producer surplus is explained by 
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the low own-price elasticity of supply. This means that quantity produced barely reacts 
to a change in price. Total welfare increased only by 0.5%. However, the second analysis 
indicate considerably higher total welfare than any other analysis. In other analyses the 
total welfare level fluctuates around 25 billion euro. In this second analysis the total wel-
fare is over 60 billion euro.  
In the third case, the own-price elasticity of supply valued 0.45 and demand −1.1. Thus, 
supply was inelastic and demand elastic. With these values consumer surplus increased 
42.2% while producer surplus decreased 15.7%. Total welfare increased 1.6%. These val-
ues indicate similar results than most of the other sensitivity analysis results.  
The presented sensitivity analysis showed that by manipulating elasticity values, the 
amount and the relation of consumer and producer surpluses change. In the base analysis 
the total welfare was around 24 billion euro while in the sensitivity analyses total welfare 
values fluctuated mainly between 25 billion to nearly 30 billion euro. Exception in total 
welfare level was the second case presented in Table 9 where total welfare reached over 
60 billion euro. The deviation from other sensitivity analyses is explained by the signifi-
cantly low (inelastic) own-price elasticity of supply. In all, the presented sensitivity anal-
ysis showed greater changes in obtained results than in the base analysis. To gain more 
precise knowledge of the welfare and other trade effects of SPS measures on trade, there 
is a clear need to estimate elasticity parameters for poultry meat demand and supply in 
the EU. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
Countries are increasingly seeking new trade opportunities by arranging trade bilaterally 
or plurilaterally forming regional trade agreements. The number of RTAs has increased 
significantly during the last decades and the evolution has directed towards deep integra-
tion and mega-regional agreements. These agreements play an important role in the world 
trading system and especially in agricultural trade because already more than half of all 
agro-food products are traded between or within RTAs. This increasing inclusion of ag-
ricultural sector in trade agreements has revealed new types of measures that distort and 
restrict international agro-food trade.  
 
In the past, tariffs and quotas were main instruments used as trade policy measures to 
restrict trade and protect domestic producers. Nowadays, tariff levels for most agricultural 
commodities have been reduced and the use of quotas prohibited. However, trade has not 
increased as expected and rising interest towards non-tariff measures has evolved. Sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures are among the most troublesome non-tariff barriers re-
lated to agro-food trade. The reason is the variety of SPS measures and their impacts. The 
general intention of SPS measures is to protect human, animal and plant health but some-
times they are targeted to restrict trade intentionally. In such cases the use of SPS 
measures is unjustified. 
 
This study attempted to create a theoretical framework for SPS measures and their impact 
on trade. The effects were found to depend first of all on the burden of compliance and 
the nature of a SPS measure. Burden of compliance included three dimension of specific, 
uniform or universal measures. This information indicates who bears the cost caused by 
the SPS measures. For the nature of the SPS measures three categories were identified: 
cost-increasing, quantity-restricting and combining SPS measures. Cost-increasing 
measures imply similar effects than tariffs. The costs are generally direct and easily meas-
ured. Quantity-restricting measures affect similarly to quota and restrict trade partially or 
totally. Combining SPS measures include characteristics from both former types. Com-
bining measures are often related to differing standards between countries. In practice, an 
   68 
   
exporting country has to comply with standards set by an importing country. If the ex-
porting country manages to comply, the exports may take place. This may though, in-
crease the cost of production.  
Each measure has to be evaluated separately which makes the quantification of the trade 
effects even more challenging. Normally trade costs can be calculated from direct costs 
of a measure (e.g. in case of tariffs). SPS measures cause direct costs but also indirect 
costs which are difficult to identify and measure. This complicates the quantification of 
their true effects on trade. Successful evaluation and quantification of the effects requires 
first, throughout knowledge of the certain SPS measure examined, second, recognition of 
the burden of compliance related to the applied SPS measure and third, need to determine 
on which category the SPS measure belongs according to its nature.  
The empirical part of the study dealt with the sanitary and phytosanitary measure in poul-
try meat trade between the EU and the US. The attempt was to quantify the welfare effect 
caused by a change in trade policy regime in the EU. The measurement was carried out 
by using partial equilibrium comparative static analysis in Marshallian economic surplus 
framework. Economic surplus measures were calculated by comparing the initial level of 
welfare to the level after the change in the application of the SPS measure by the EU. In 
the calculations, producer price was expected to decrease by 20% after the policy change. 
The results indicated that consumer surplus would increase 13.2 billion euro (+22.4%) 
while producer surplus would decrease by 10.7 billion euro (−24.5%) in comparison to 
the welfare level when the SPS measure is effective. Increase in consumer welfare is due 
to decrease in price level and simultaneous increase in consumption possibilities. The 
decrease in producer welfare is due to lower producer price and thus decrease in produc-
tion. Total economic welfare would increase by 0.3 billion euro (+1.4%). The results in-
dicate that the present SPS measure in force causes a deadweight loss of 0.3 billion euro 
for the society.  
The welfare analysis managed to reveal that the SPS measure has effect on producer and 
consumer welfare in the EU. The present trade policy regime causes a deadweight loss to 
the society and thus, making the SPS measure ineffective would benefit the society as a 
whole. However, it must be noted that according to this examination the policy change 
would benefit consumers while harming producers. It must be noted though that in the 
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real world the consumer surplus is affected by consumer preferences. For this reason, the 
prohibition of the use of PRTs may even increase the consumer welfare in the EU. 
Sensitivity analysis indicated that the relation of the changes between consumer and pro-
ducer surpluses change when elasticity values change. The elasticities used in the base 
analysis are not the most applicable to this context as they are calculated for different 
markets and were not up-to-date values.  
Partial equilibrium framework analysis is useful for examination of trade effects when a 
specific market is examined and when. The parameters are easy to change in a partial 
equilibrium model and changes in the markets can be observed clearly. However, the PE 
analysis is made in isolation of other sectors in the society and for this reason, it ignores 
e.g. third country effects. For example, in the welfare analysis it was noted that the import 
demand would increase 3.0 million tons from the US. It is unlikely that the increased 
imports would originate only from the US. To find out the wider effects of the examined 
policy change on the society, one could use general equilibrium model. 
The theory of economic integration assumes that a regional trade agreement leads to trade 
diversion and trade creation effects. Applying the trade creation effect in the trade be-
tween the EU and the US, it is assumed that the production would move from the EU to 
the US. This would occur as the cost of poultry meat production in the EU is higher than 
in the US. The decrease in the domestic supply in the EU would be replaced by the im-
ports from the US. Trade diversion would take place when imports increased from the US 
and decreased from the less expensive origins such as Brazil. The trade between the EU 
and the US would increase to some extent if the SPS measure of PRTs became ineffective. 
However, it is unlikely that the US poultry meat would replace other existing import ori-
gins of poultry meat. 
 
8.1. Suggestions for future research 
 
Trade impacts of SPS measures has been studied in quantitative manner relatively little. 
The difficulty to recognize the direct and indirect impacts of such measures partly explain 
the lack of research. For this reason, there is a clear need to widen the knowledge of the 
theoretical background to recognize the effects and further to quantify them successfully. 
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This study attempted to form a theoretical categorization of the SPS measures based on 
the different effects on trade. This framework is hoped to help in the future analysis of 
SPS measures. The framework should still be reviewed. 
Considering the empirical part of the study, the importance of accurate elasticity infor-
mation cannot be undermined. Thus, there would be a need to compute timely and trust-
worthy own-price elasticity values for supply and demand for poultry meat in the EU. It 
would also be useful to apply general equilibrium model to the examination of the SPS 
measures impact on trade to find out the wider effects on the other sectors of the society.    
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Appendix 1 
 
Defining parameters for demand and supply functions 
 
  
Demand function Pd=D(Q) 
  
 
a1= Pd/Ed*Qd 
a0=Pd−a1*Qd 
  
 Pd= Consumer price 
 Ed= Own-Price elasticity of demand 
 
Qd=Quantity demanded 
 
  
Supply function Ps=S(Q) 
  
 
b1= Ps/Es*Qs 
b0=Ps−b1*Qs 
  
 Ps= Producer price 
 Es= Own-Price elasticity of supply 
 Qs= Quantity supplied 
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Appendix 2 
 
Defining demand and supply functions 
Quantity supplied (Qs) 12 675 314 tons 
Own-price elasticity of supply (Es)     0.73  
Producer price 1273.4 €/ton 
   
   
Quantity demanded (Qd) 12 287 000 tons 
Own-price elasticity of demand (Ed) −0.61  
Consumer price 1273.4 €/ton 
 
Defined parameters 
For demand   a0 = 3360.94  a1 = −0.00017 
For supply  b0 = −470.98  b1 = 0.00014 
 
Defining equilibrium quantity and price 
In equilibrium Pd = Ps   
Pd= 3360.94−0.00017 (Qd)  
Ps = −470.98+0.00014(Qs) 
 
Quantity 
 0.00014(Q)+ 0.00017(Q) = 470.98+3360.94 
 0.0003(Q) = 3831.92 
 12 460 777 tons 
Price 
 −470.98+0.00014*12 460 777 
 1243.88 €/ton 
 
Defining consumer and producer surplus in equilibrium 
 
CS  [(3360.94−1243.88)* 12 460 777]/2 = 13 190 141 854 €  
PS  [(1243.88+470.98)* 12 460 777]/2 = 10 684 238 466 € 
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Defining parameters after price change (p = −20%) 
 
New producer price   1018.72 €/ton (−20%) 
New quantity supplied (Qs) 10 824 718 tons (−14.6%) 
New quantity demanded (Qd) 13 786 014 tons (+12.2%) 
Import demand  2 961 296 tons 
 
Defining consumer and producer surplus in the new trade policy regime 
 
CS  [(3360.94−1018.72)* 13 786 014]/2 = 16 144 945 636 €  
PS  [(1018.72 +470.98)* 10 824 718]/2 = 8 062 810 595 € 
 
 
 
 
 
